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INTRODUCTION 
Few would argue, children’s education is one of the most valued pieces 
of a successful society’s foundation.  Our founding fathers expressed this 
idea as they contemplated ways to ensure the survival of our democracy.1  
Thomas Jefferson believed a general diffusion of knowledge was 
essential to maintain a democratic society.2  In 1779, he proposed a bill 
to provide three years of free education to male and female White 
children, where they would learn reading, writing, and arithmetic.3  The 
Supreme Court of the United States also expressed the essential nature of 
education in several famous cases.4  In Brown v. Board of Education, 
Chief Justice Warren stated education “is the very foundation of good 
citizenship . . . .  [I]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
 
1. See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18 June 1779,  
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-
0079 [https://perma.cc/2RTN-QTCU] (sharing the warning that by not educating the common 
people, the nation would be vulnerable to the natural tendency of those with the power of 
corruption). 
2. Cf. Id. (stating the best way to prevent the corruption by the powerful is “to 
illuminate . . . the minds of the people at large . . . .”). 
3. See id. (expunging education at the personal expense of the learner by expressing the 
importance of teaching certain subjects to males and females with free tuition). 
4. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (outlining the significance of 
education in today’s society and how it is the basic foundation to a democracy). 
2
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reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity 
of an education.”5  In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan says, “education 
provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically 
productive lives to the benefit of us all . . . .  [E]ducation has a 
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”6   
Yet, despite how much we supposedly value education, the Supreme 
Court declined to recognize education as a fundamental right in San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez.7  In Rodriguez, the Mexican 
American parents of children attending school in Edgewood ISD brought 
an equal protection claim to attack the Texas school finance system.8  The 
suit was brought on behalf of school children who are members of 
minority groups and come from districts with a low property value base.9  
The facts of the case showed a wide disparity in funding between 
Edgewood ISD, whose residents were 90% Mexican American and 6% 
African American, and Alamo Heights ISD, whose residents were only 
18% Mexican American and 1% African American.10  Edgewood ISD 
had a property value per pupil averaging $5,960, while Alamo Heights 
ISD’s average property value per pupil was more than $49,000.11  These 
numbers are significant because they are the bases from which the 
districts may tax.12  Though these numbers clearly showed the Texas 
school finance system discriminates against districts with low property 
wealth, the Court declined to establish wealth as a suspect class.13  In 
addition, the Court decided education is not a fundamental right because 
it is not adequately related to exercising First Amendment freedoms or 
 
5. Id.  
6. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (warning the denial of education to certain groups 
and granting it to others has a costly impact on society). 
7. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding education 
is not a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
8. Id. at 4–5. 
9. Id. 
10. See id. at 12–13 (summarizing the unequal distribution of money in relation to 
percentage of minorities). 
11. Id. at 12–13. 
12. See id. at 1, 9 (explaining the allocation of funds for expenditures based on the school 
district’s ability to tax). 
13. See id. at 1, 20 (deciding the discriminated class of persons could not be clearly 
identified). 
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the right to vote;14 the Court felt if it found otherwise, the rights to 
housing and food would deserve fundamental rights status.15  
Consequently, the Court applied a rational basis standard rather than a 
strict scrutiny standard, and the Texas school finance system passed 
muster.16   
The holding of this case had numerous negative consequences for the 
state of education in the future.17  Had the Court recognized education as 
a fundamental right, the Texas Legislature would have been forced to 
modify the school finance system so school districts would have equal 
opportunity to receive equal funding.18  Though significant progress has 
been made in creating a less discriminatory system of funding, Texas 
schools are at the mercy of the legislature to ensure consistent funding 
without the protection of fundamental rights status.19   
In this Comment, I argue without further action, the improvements 
made to school finance through House Bill (HB) 3 will not survive the 
test of time, and any progress made will be lost to the whim of the 
 
14. But see Ian Vandewalker & Keith Gunnar Bentele, Vulnerability in Numbers: Racial 
Composition of the Electorate, Voter Suppression, and the Voting Rights Act, 18 HARV. LATINO L. 
REV. 99, 127–34 (2015) (finding a correlation between restrictive voting laws and a state’s racial 
composition of minority populations where people of color are more likely to be barred from 
participation in the political process due to a higher number of people of color living in poverty 
with a limited education). 
15. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–38 (determining appellees’ nexus theory has no logical 
limits and questioning, “[h]ow for instance, [whether] education [can] be distinguished from the 
significant personal interests in the basics of food and shelter?”). 
16. See id. at 58–60 (reasoning how Texas has put forth effort to improve the finance system, 
and if the Court were to rule otherwise, it would run the risk of acting as a super legislature). 
17. See Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991) (illustrating the cycle of reform, complacency, inflation and higher 
enrollment, disparity, and the push for reform the holding in San Antonio ISD v. Rodriguez failed 
to end). 
18. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16–17 (admitting the Texas school finance system would not 
withstand strict scrutiny). 
19.  See, e.g., Albert Kauffman, The Texas School Finance Litigation Saga: Great Progress, 
then Near Death by a Thousand Cuts, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 511, 523 (2008) [hereinafter Litigation 
Saga] (discussing the equalizing effect of the system of recapture that was developed by the 
legislature to address inequities of financial funding for lower wealth school districts).   
See generally History of LWVTX Public Education Finance Action, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS 
OF TEX., https://my.lwv.org/texas/history-lwvtx-public-education-finance-action [https://perma.cc 
/ZW68-RAVN] (documenting instances where the Legislature made cuts to the education budget 
for various reasons and then struggled to restore the budget; this timeline shows increases to the 
education budget may look positive in a vacuum, but they still may not make up for losses of 
previous budget cuts). 
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legislature or the volatile nature of overdependency on sales taxes.  
Communities of color and communities experiencing poverty are the 
populations most impacted by losses to education finance; the students in 
these communities cannot afford to rely on promises lacking a concrete 
plan.  Much of the allure of HB 3 is that the state has volunteered to 
contribute more of the money needed for school finance.  However, 
because there is no long-term method for generating that revenue and 
reserving it for education, it could one day amount to nothing more than 
an “IOU.”  In section II, I will briefly discuss how Texas arrived at the 
current state of school finance by looking at the first and last cases of the 
Edgewood saga.20  Additionally, I will describe the change in standard 
of a constitutional financial system from a measurable one of efficiency 
to the ambiguous and unworkable test of arbitrariness.  In section III, I 
will briefly explain the basic mechanics of school finance.  In section IV, 
I will discuss the positive and negative aspects of HB 3.  Section V will 
cover methods that we, as a nation, have taken to address problems within 
our system of education and international methods other countries 
emphasize to ensure success.  In section VI, I offer tangible and intangible 
solutions to address the problems with our school finance system in 
Texas.   
I.    HISTORY OF TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE 
The progression of school finance throughout Texas’s history has been 
neither linear nor positive.21  The Texas Supreme Court held the school 
finance system was unconstitutional in 1989,22 and six challenges later it 
held the system met “minimum constitutional requirements” in 2016.23  
Funding for Texas public schools was originally intended to be done 
equitably.24  In 1876, school funds were apportioned on a per capita 
basis.25  For example, the state levied a uniform poll tax to raise money 
for the state’s school fund with each student receiving the same amount 
 
20. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
21. See generally Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 529–52 (discussing the varying 
standards the Texas school finance system was subject to over the span of the six Edgewood cases). 
22. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398. 
23. Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2016) 
(upholding “the current school funding regime” despite its undeniable imperfections). 
24. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396 (concluding the constitutional framers and ratifiers 
intended a system where tax burdens for education costs would be uniformly applied). 
25. Id. at 396. 
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of funding.26  As cities expanded and the population multiplied, a more 
complex system of generating revenue developed.27  In 1883, the Texas 
Legislature amended the state Constitution and created school districts 
with the power to levy local taxes.28  Currently, all of the property in a 
school district is taxed at a rate set by that district.29  The amount of 
revenue created depends on how much the districts decide to tax and the 
valuation of the property in a given district.30  The facts stated in 
Edgewood v. Kirby31 are an excellent example of the inequities that arise 
through this method of generating revenue.32   
A. Edgewood ISD v. Kirby 
The first Edgewood33 case in 1989 was a significant turning point in 
the fight for an equitable and efficient financial system.34  In this seminal 
case, the Supreme Court of Texas held the Texas school finance system 
was unconstitutional because it violated Art. VII § 1 of the Texas 
Constitution.35  This section provides: “A general diffusion of 
knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights 
of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to 
 
26. See id. (utilizing the example of the poll tax to depict a method of generating revenue 
uniformly applied throughout the state). 
27. See id. (detailing the staggering impact on uneven economic development on the school 
financing system throughout the state of Texas). 
28. See Brian Stork, What About Our Future? The Chaos that is the Texas School Finance 
System, 8 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 307, 312 (2006) (explaining the 
financial shift when Texas required school districts to supplement revenue granted by the state). 
29. See Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 521 (describing factors that districts are permitted 
to consider when setting their tax rates). 
30. See id. at 514–15 (stating the equations that compute the amount of money a school will 
have to spend on each student rely, in part, on property wealth per student and the tax rate each 
district sets). 
31. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392–93. 
32. See Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme Court Retreats from Protecting Texas 
Students, 19 SCHOLAR 145, 147–48 (2017) (referring to Edgewood I and how it led to positive 
changes for low-wealth districts). 
33. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394–96.  
34. See Stork, supra note 28, at 318–20 (outlining the efforts of the Texas Legislature in 
creating a more efficient finance system after Edgewood I).  
35. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398 (holding the Texas school financing system violates 
the Texas Constitution’s “efficiency” provision).  But see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 145 
(criticizing the devolution and retreat of the Texas Supreme Court in its refusal to uphold the 
standards of the original Edgewood case). 
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establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of 
an efficient system of public free schools.”36  One of the many reasons 
this case left a lasting impression was the way it described the 
ramifications children experience when lower income schools are not 
well-funded.37  Schools without proper funding often lack important 
educational programs.38  To illustrate this point, the Court chose San 
Elizario ISD.39  This school district did not have foreign language 
classes, pre-kindergarten, chemistry, physics, or calculus.40  In addition, 
the district lacked the ability to offer any extra-curricular or enrichment 
programs such as band, debate, or even football.41  Meanwhile, high-
wealth districts are able to enhance children’s learning experiences and 
increase their chances of getting higher education because they can afford 
to utilize effective programs and tools.42  Some of these advantages 
include: more extensive curricula, modern technological equipment, 
better libraries, teacher aides, lower student-teacher ratios, better 
facilities, and drop-out prevention programs.43   
 
36. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (“Children who live in 
poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal 
opportunity to have access to educational funds.  Certainly, this much is required if the state is to 
educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide.”). 
37. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392–94 (underlying the vast inequities in experience and 
opportunity children of low socioeconomic status face). 
38. See id. at 393 (presenting the differences in experience children in a low-wealth district 
have compared to the experiences of children in a high-wealth district).  But cf. San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) (disregarding the effect poor funding has on some 
districts and arguing “some inequality . . . is not alone sufficient basis for striking down the entire 
system.”). 
39. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393. 
40. Id.  
41. See id. (listing college preparatory and honors programs as additional unavailable 
opportunities). 
42. See id. (“The amount of money spent on a student’s education has a real and meaningful 
impact on the educational opportunity offered that student.”). 
43. See id. (“They are also better able to attract and retain experienced teachers and 
administrators.”); see also Corbett Smith, Texas Is Spending Billions More on Education but 
Teachers May Not Get the Raises They Expect, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 30, 2019), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2019/06/30/texas-is-spending-billions-more-on-
education-but-teachers-may-not-get-the-raises-they-expect/ [https://perma.cc/H4QN-RLCE] 
(discussing how school districts are able to remain competitive by offering higher teacher salaries 
when funding is increased). 
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The Court in Edgewood focused on the meaning of the word 
“efficient.”44  The defendants in the case argued “efficient” merely 
means “economical” or “inexpensive” and that efficiency is a political 
question.45  The Court did not accept this argument and instead noted a 
link between equality and efficiency.46  The drafters of the provision in 
Article VII likely never contemplated the possibility that a finance system 
producing such significant inequalities could be efficient.47  Another 
reason Edgewood 48 is such a significant case is because it highlighted 
those significant inequalities in a clear and brazen way that was not soon 
forgotten.49  During the 1985–1986 school year, spending per student 
varied from $2,112 to $19,333.50  At the time, school districts generated 
funding for 50% of total education costs.51  School districts generated 
this money through ad valorem property taxes.52  In 1985–1986, most 
property-rich districts only had to tax $.09 per $100 valuation and were 
able to make significantly more money than the most property-poor 
 
44. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394 (defining the different possible meanings of the word 
“efficient” because the word would essentially be the test for constitutionality).  But see Morath v. 
Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 845–55, 863 (Tex. 2016) (focusing on 
the “adequacy” of the educational system to determine its compliance with the Texas Constitution, 
rather than how “efficient” it is). 
45. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393–94 (summarizing the arguments of opposing counsel 
which describes the duties of the Legislature and judiciary systems of public school funding).  See 
generally TEX. CONST. Art. VII, § 1 (“[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to 
establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of 
public free schools.”). 
46. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (“[T]his court has recognized the implicit link that 
the Texas Constitution establishes between efficiency and equality”); see also Kauffman, supra 
note 32, at 149–50 (reinforcing the assertion that the Edgewood “financial efficiency test” is the 
only true measure of long-term enforceable equality in the school system and later decisions have 
left a “multiple escape hatch” test designed to defer to the states’ Legislature). 
47. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396 (noting the structure of the school finance system 
from 1876 through 1886 had neither districts nor other local taxing structures; thus, the burden of 
school taxation fell equally and uniformly across the state where each student was entitled to the 
same amount of those funds). 
48. Id. at 391. 
49. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 147 (listing the series of cases that came after and were 
made possible through the profound authority presented in Edgewood I). 
50. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392. 
51. See id. (noting “the state provides about forty-two percent” of federal funds in 
comparison to other sources of funding). 
52. See id. (outlining the gross disparities between districts in their ability to raise property 
tax revenue as taxable property wealth varies exponentially between districts). 
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district which taxed $1.55 per $100 valuation.53  During the same time 
period, the bottom 100 poorest property districts had an average tax rate 
of 74.5 cents only to spend $2,978 per student, while the top 100 
property-rich districts taxed only 47 cents and were able to spend $7,233 
per student.54  School districts clearly did not have equal access to equal 
funding.55  Lastly, the Court in Edgewood I suggests local taxation is not 
in and of itself a problem.56  Rather, local taxation should be used to 
supplement an already efficient school finance system.57  Unfortunately, 
the promise of complete finance reform never came to fruition.58  The 
ruling in Edgewood 59 was challenged in a series of cases until the matter 
was put to rest in Morath v. Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness 
Coalition.60   
B. Morath v. Texas Taxpayer (Edgewood VII) 
In 2011, the Texas legislature cut school finance funding by over five 
billion dollars.61  As a result of the budget cut, school districts brought 
 
53. Id. at 393 (“[T]he property-poor districts with their high tax rates and inferior schools 
are unable to attract new industry or development and so have little opportunity to improve their 
tax base.”). 
54. See id. (applying these figures to illustrate how “[p]roperty-poor districts are trapped in 
a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves.”). 
55. See id. at 392 (“The average property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is more than 
twenty times greater than the average property wealth in the 100 poorest districts.”). 
56. See id. at 396 (proclaiming local taxing is an issue because efficiency has not been 
maintained through inequities in wealth growth across the state). 
57. See id. (“However, we conclude that this provision was intended not to preclude an 
efficient system but to serve as a vehicle for injecting more money into an efficient system.”). 
58. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 149 (noting the final case in the Edgewood series, 
Morath v. Texas Taxpayer and Student Fairness Coalition, where the Court ruled the school finance 
system constitutional). 
59. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398–400. 
60. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 149 (illustrating the latest of seven Texas Supreme 
Court decisions examining the state constitutionality of Texas’s school finance system); see also 
Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Tex. 2016) (“Judicial 
review, however, does not license second-guessing the political branches’ policy choices, or 
substituting the wisdom of nine judges for that of 181 lawmakers.  Our role is much more limited, 
as is our holding: Despite the imperfections of the current school funding regime, it meets minimum 
constitutional requirements.”). 
61. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 161 (articulating the Texas Legislature’s decision to 
decrease school finance funding by over five billion dollars for the 2012–2013 fiscal year). 
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suit in district court.62  At the time, there were a little over a thousand 
school districts, and more than half of them participated in the suit.63  The 
district court found the school finance system violated the Texas 
Constitution in several respects, and, notably, English language learners 
and economically disadvantaged students fared the worst in the system.64  
The case was taken to the Texas Supreme Court where the Court ruled 
the finance system was adequate, suitable, efficient, and in accordance 
with the Texas Constitution.65  Though the Court gave strong 
commentary on the need for “transformational, top-to-bottom reforms 
that amount to more than a Band-Aid” in the school finance system, the 
Court declined to enforce the Texas Constitution and prompt change.66  
Instead, the Court repeated the mantra that it is not the judiciaries’ 
responsibility to second-guess the legislature on issues of education 
policy.67  It is counterintuitive for the Texas Supreme Court to believe it 
would overstep its boundaries if it were to follow the measurable standard 
of efficiency.68  The Court chose to presume the finance system is 
constitutional and called the “arbitrariness standard” a “very deferential 
standard.”69  By saying it is not the place of the Court to “second-guess” 
the school finance system, the Court neglects to recognize its role in 
maintaining the law of the state is precisely to second-guess the matters 
 
62. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 833 (“[M]ore than half of the State’s 1,000-plus school districts 
have brought the most far-reaching funding challenge in Texas history.”); see Kauffman, supra 
note 32, at 162 (exploring how the Legislature’s decision to make the five billion-dollar-cut to 
education would set the stage for the Morath litigation). 
63. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 833. 
64. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 162 (explaining the holdings of the district court as 
they followed precedent set by Edgewood V1). 
65. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 886; see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 162–63 (describing how 
the Texas Supreme Court refused to uphold the district court’s findings that the school finance 
system was inadequate, unsuitable, and inefficient). 
66. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 834 (commenting on the imperfect Texas school system and how 
Texas school children deserve better). 
67. See id. at 833 (emphasizing a judiciaries’ limited role and the need to merely find a 
minimum constitutional fulfillment to uphold the Texas school finance system). 
68. See id. at 845 (“But we acknowledged substantial evidence ‘that the public education 
system has reached the point where continued improvement will not be possible without significant 
change,’ and that ‘it remains to be seen whether the system’s predicted drift toward constitutional 
inadequacy will be avoided by legislative reaction to widespread calls for changes.’”). 
69. Id. at 846 (“Under this ‘very deferential’ standard, we must not substitute our policy 
preferences for the Legislature’s . . . .”). 
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that come before it.70  Additionally, the Court had no qualms showing a 
deferential standard to the Legislature, who itself decides what will 
satisfy the Texas Constitution.71  This case marks the Texas Supreme 
Court’s commitment to using the “arbitrariness” standard over the 
“efficiency” standard set forth in Edgewood I.72  In an analysis of 
Edgewood I,73 the Court emphasizes when the finance system was ruled 
unconstitutional, the state was not using the system of recapture to help 
equalize funding.74  An “arbitrariness” standard weighs heavily in favor 
of the state because the Court will only rule against school finance 
legislation if it was made arbitrarily and unreasonably.75  Any party who 
wishes to challenge the constitutionality of school finance legislation will 
find the arbitrariness standard extremely difficult to overcome.76 
C. The Failings of Texas’s School Finance System 
“Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which 
there is no opportunity to free themselves.”77  At the time of Edgewood 
in 1989, school districts lacking property wealth had to compensate by 
setting higher property tax rates on the communities in the district.78  The 
Foundation School Program is a state program aimed at providing enough 
funds for at least a basic education in school districts.79  However, the 
 
70. See id. (recognizing the Court adhered to the standard of reasonableness as a “default 
position of deference to the Legislature.”).   
71. Id.; see Kauffman, supra note 32, at 166 (depicting the disproportional, illogical 
deference the Texas Supreme Court shows the Legislature). 
72. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 845–46 (“Our role is consequential yet confined, strictly 
circumscribed by a deferential standard of review, as well as our own prior decisions in this unique 
area of the law.”). 
73. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
74. See Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 843 (distinguishing the state of school finance in 1989 from 
2015). 
75. Id. at 846 (furthering the notion that the Legislature will only hold a school financial 
system unconstitutional when it is arbitrary). 
76. See Kauffman, supra note 32, at 166 (arguing no party challenging a school finance 
system is likely to overcome the legal hurdles established by the court). 
77. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 393. 
78. See id. (“Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the 
property-poor districts must tax high merely to spend low.”). 
79. Id. at 392 (“Under this program, state aid is distributed to the various districts according 
to a complex formula such that property-poor districts receive more state aid than do property-rich 
districts.”). 
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program failed to cover minimum mandated requirements in 1989.80  
When the Foundation Program did not provide enough funds for a basic 
education, low-wealth schools were forced to set high tax rates to meet 
those minimum requirements.81  High property tax rates are not very 
tempting to new developers, so the low-wealth districts have a hard time 
increasing their property value and then must tax high to get the needed 
revenue.82  The cycle was nearly impossible to break until the 
introduction of the “recapture” system.83   
II.    THE BASIC MECHANICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE 
School districts obtain money in a variety of ways—most of it 
stemming from local property taxes and state funding.84  A majority of a 
district’s budget will come from local property taxes, while the rest is 
supplied by the state.85  In 2018, local property owners supplied about 
64% of their district’s education budget.86  There is a public perception 
that local taxpayers and the state contribute a more or less equal share 
towards public education.87  However, in recent years, as property values 
rose so did the amount local taxpayers contributed.88  Rather than 
 
80. See id. (extending the Foundation School Program’s hopeful role in ensuring each 
district had the funds to give every child a basic education, but expressing its inability to do so due 
to poor funding of the program). 
81. See id. at 393 (discussing how property-poor districts must tax at higher rates to meet 
minimum requirements such as accreditation). 
82. See id. (noting that property-poor districts are unable to attract new industry because of 
their high tax rates). 
83. Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 577 (purporting the equalizing effect recapture has 
had on school districts in Texas and pointing to recapture’s economic benefits for the Legislature 
as a funds generator for the state). 
84. See Aliyya Swaby, Texas’ School Finance System Is Unpopular and Complex.  Here’s 
How It Works, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/02/15/ 
texas-school-funding-how-it-works/ [https://perma.cc/Q665-FDPJ] (indicating the two main 
sources of revenue for school districts are property taxes and state funding). 
85. See id. (explaining how school districts first use the property tax and then the state pays 
the remaining balance). 
86. See id. (describing what a school district’s educational budget is comprised of). 
87. See Glenn Hegar, Texas School Finance: Doing the Math on the State’s Biggest 
Expenditure, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCTS. 13 (Jan. 2019), https://comptroller.texas.gov/ 
economy/fiscal-notes/2019/jan/ [https://perma.cc/Y2U4-W4VB] (explaining the state has only 
averaged a 40% contribution from 2000 to 2018). 
88. See id. at 6 (providing how property values rose by 128% since 1997, causing Texas’s 
public education funding formulas to increase their dependence on local property taxes). 
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continuing to contribute the same amount of funding, the state saved 
money and was able to contribute less.89  Some have opined the state 
should take up more of the burden to pay for public education and 
legislators heard them in HB 3.90  Decreasing the public’s property tax 
burden was a priority for legislators this session, but the rub is it 
automatically increases the burden on the already limited state’s 
budget.91  Despite the priority to reduce the public’s burden in property 
taxes, the state largely obtains its revenue from the public either way 
through sales taxes and other methods.92   
While the Texas Constitution grants each school district the power to 
levy local taxes, each district’s school board sets the tax rate.93  There 
are certain parameters a school district’s board must follow which limits 
how much they can tax.94  These parameters are established through the 
use of formulas, but a majority of school districts are required to tax at 
least $1.00 per $100.00 valuation.95  Tax rates of up to $1.04 do not need 
to be approved by local voters, but if a board wants to tax over that, they 
will have to call an election.96  In 2018, the maximum tax rate was: $1.17 
per $100.00 valuation.97  As of 2018, about 400 school districts maxed 
out their taxation rates and were prohibited from increasing taxes due to 
state law.98  Property-wealthy school districts that generate significant 
revenue at a lower tax rate have to send some of their excess funds back 
to the state which is then redistributed to districts with lower property 
 
89. See id. at 13–14 (emphasizing an inverse relationship between state and local funding 
where local funding increases, state funding decreases). 
90. See id. at 6 (indicating the varied plaintiffs involved demonstrated the wide divergence 
of opinions regarding school finance). 
91. See id. at 14 (“Texas public education funding formulas have ensured increased 
dependence on local property taxes—and a growing burden on homeowners and businesses.”). 
92. See id. at 15 (establishing the importance of the general sales tax as a means of revenue 
as it has averaged 60.5% of state tax collections since 1993). 
93. See Swaby, supra note 84 (stating school boards set tax rates, decide how much to 
increase the rates, and get to decide when to ask for voter’s approval or at times may do so without 
community input). 
94. See id. (recognizing the minimum and maximum tax rates).  
95. See id. (explaining how tax rate ratios work in school districts). 
96. See id. (outlining how permission is needed from voters if the tax rises above a certain 
amount). 
97. Id. 
98. See id. (emphasizing the tax rate disparity between wealthier and poorer school 
districts).  
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values.99  The state begins by giving the same amount of money to each 
student per average daily attendance in a district—this amount is called a 
basic allotment.100  Districts can get more money per each individual 
student depending on certain variables, such as whether they fall into a 
category of students that are more expensive to teach.101  Examples of 
these variables include: students with disabilities, low-income students, 
and English language learners.102   
III.    HB 3 
The newest school finance bill, HB 3, was passed June 11, 2019.103  
HB 3 received overwhelmingly positive reports from news organizations, 
and for a good reason.104  HB 3 has many positive attributes, the most 
popular of which is arguably an increase in pay for some teachers.105  
Other positive aspects of HB 3 include: support for low-income students 
and English language learners who are in dual language programs, giving 
districts with low-income students more funding per low-income student, 
and increasing funds for special education students.106  Some of the more 
negative aspects of the bill include spending $5.2 billion on reducing 
local school property taxes, a lack of sustainable sources of funding, and 
 
99. See id. (referring to the system of recapture, which gives poorer school districts a 
financial boost).  
100. Id. 
101. See id. (explaining how districts get extra money for students who fall under certain 
categories).  
102. See id. (listing various ways districts can get extra money); see also Chandra 
Villanueva, School Finance Moves Forward: House and Senate to Work Out Differences in HB 3, 
EVERY TEXAN 3 (May 9, 2019), https://everytexan.org/images/2019_EO_CPPP_HB3_Conference 
Recs_86.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E9JM-YYJ9] (describing the circumstances surrounding dual 
language learners). 
103. Leo Lopez, House Bill 3 Implementation Salary Increases, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY  
(June 11, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20House%20Bill%203%20Im 
plementation%20Salary%20Increases%206.11.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NUH-35NZ] (describing 
the requirements, methodologies, and funding implications under HB 3). 
104. See Megan Hempel, House Bill 3 Marks Major Triumph, CORSICANA DAILY SUN 
(June 16, 2019), https://www.corsicanadailysun.com/news/house-bill-marks-major-triumph/article 
_1a94c13a-8eef-11e9-9528-47518f9d6344.html [https://perma.cc/4Z5Y-RKGG] (“This one law 
does more to advance education in the state of Texas than any law that I have seen in my adult 
lifetime in the state of Texas.”). 
105. Id. 
106. See generally Luis Figueroa, Closing Thoughts on HB 3, the Big School Finance Bill, 
EVERY TEXAN (May 25, 2019) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and 
Social Justice) (summarizing the positive and negative aspects of HB 3). 
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inequitable tax compression.107  The Center for Public Policy Priorities 
(CPPP) suggests spending over $5 billion on reducing local school 
property taxes is the “wrong priority,” especially considering the state’s 
commitment to buy down school property taxes increases after 2021.108  
Lacking a source for sustainable funding will cause unwanted tension 
with other parts of the budget,109 and there are school officials who 
express unease with making significant changes in their schools to rely 
on the new funding.110 
A. Inequitable Tax Compression 
HB 3 requires Texas school districts to reduce their tier one tax rates 
and any tax rate compression required to be applied to the enrichment tax 
rates they may have.111  This portion of the bill is identified as the most 
disappointing.112  “The tier one tax rate must be reduced by the state 
compression percentage which is 93% for the 2019–2020 school 
year.”113  Enrichment must be compressed by 0.64834.114  These 




109. See id. (“The bill lacks a sustainable source of funding for our schools in the future, 
which will put more pressure on other parts of the budget.”). 
110. See Chevall Pryce, Officials Speak on School Funding, Reform in Texas Legislature, 
HOUS. CHRON. (May 10, 2019, 9:17 AM), https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/cyfair/schools/ 
article/Officials-speak-on-school-funding-reform-in-13835149.php. [https://perma.cc/H4HF-44 
W8] (quoting Stuart Snow, chief financial officer for Cy-Fair ISD, saying “when it’s a state 
mandated increase you’re dependent upon the sustainability of that funding over a long period of 
time . . . .  [HB 3] doesn’t give the district any discretion on how [the increase is] to be 
funded . . . .”). 
111. See Al McKenzie, House Bill 3 Implementation: Tax Rate Compression, TEX. EDUC. 
AGENCY (June 11, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20House%20Bill%203% 
20Implementation%20Tax%20rate%20compression%206.11.19.pdf [perma.cc/FUC4-PW3s] 
(illustrating how tax rate calculations under HB 3 will be applied during the 2019 tax year). 
112. See generally Chandra Villanueva, School Finance Moves Forward: House and Senate 
to Work Out Differences in HB 3, EVERY TEXAN 1–2 (May 9, 2019), https://everytexan. 
org/images/2019_EO_CPPP_HB3_ConferenceRecs_86.pdf. [https://perma.cc/E9JM-YYJ9] 
(elaborating how requiring school districts to automatically reduce their tier one tax rates unfairly 
benefits wealthier districts where property values have grown significantly faster than poorer 
districts). 
113. See McKenzie, supra note 111 (discussing how to calculate a district’s maintenance 
and operations tax under HB 3). 
114. Id. 
15
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their property tax revenues grow.115  This is a problem because districts 
with rapidly rising property values can reduce their tax rates faster than 
other districts who may not experience the same amount of growth.116  
Some districts will be able to do this while remaining fully funded.117  
Every Texan, formerly the CPPP, illustrates this concept using Alamo 
Heights ISD and Edgewood ISD.118  Alamo Heights, which is more 
property-wealthy than Edgewood, would be able to lower its tax rate 
much more than Edgewood and still be fully funded while Edgewood 
would never be able to do the same without a detrimental effect to its 
revenues.119  Consequently, tax compression allows wealthy districts to 
refrain from generating revenue that could otherwise help property-poor 
schools through recapture.120  Additionally, property-wealthy districts, 
which can reduce their taxes, benefit by further attracting businesses and 
residents to the area, which also drives their property values up.121  
Viewing HB 3’s tax provision through a broader lens, it is also likely to 
promote instability and create unnecessary problems.122  Furthermore, 
HB 3’s proposed changes to the tax rate are not static.123  Each year, the 
 
115. See id. (illustrating how districts are to implement HB 3’s new requirements when 
calculating their tax rates: the sum of (a) the state compression percentage multiplied by $1.00  
(93 cents); plus (b) the greater of either the district’s tax effort exceeding more than $1 minus any 
enrichment tax rate compression or 4 cents; plus (c) the district’s current debt rate). 
116. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (highlighting the inherent advantage HB 3 grants to 
districts in areas with rapid property tax growth have over areas with low property growth).   
117. See id. (demonstrating how the rate of property tax increases in an area will influence 
a district’s ability to reduce their tax rate).  
118. See id. (comparing the disparity of financial outcomes between school districts in the 
same metro area utilizing HB 3’s new requirements).  
119. See id. (describing the unequal outcomes between property-rich districts and poverty 
poor districts).  Compare Edgewood ISD District Profile, TEX. TRIB., https://schools.texastribune. 
org/districts/edgewood-isd-bexar/ [https://perma.cc/YCW8-F5S7] (reporting 94.7% of Edgewood 
ISD’s students are considered economically disadvantaged), with Alamo Heights ISD District 
Profile, TEX. TRIB., https://schools.texastribune.org/districts/alamo-heights-isd/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4CP9-3CDH] (reporting 19.4% of Alamo Heights ISD’s students are considered economically 
disadvantaged). 
120. Villanueva, supra note 112. 
121. See generally Cory Turner, Why America’s Schools Have a Money Problem, NPR 
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/18/474256366/why-americas-schools-have-a-
money-problem [https://perma.cc/GM5F-ZAMA] (surveying general trends across the United 
States of underfunded schools and the tax structures that perpetuate them). 
122. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (predicting HB 3’s tax reforms—specifically those for 
Tier II—will evolve into an unequitable funding system). 
123. See Patrick Svitek, Gov. Greg Abbott Signs $11.6 Billion School Finance Measures 
into Law, TEX. TRIB., (June 11, 2019 11:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/06/11/texas-
16
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districts will be required to recalculate their tax rates, and every year the 
tax rates will decline.124  HB 3’s tax reforms will make it much more 
difficult for the state to supplement school districts for their losses, 
especially when tax revenues decline and educational needs remain 
constant or grow.125  An increased burden on the state may seem like a 
relief, but the reality is that a commitment to pay more over time reduces 
the state’s ability to make future investments.126  All districts should 
have equal access to revenue at similar tax rates because Texas courts 
have agreed every child is promised a similar quality of education.127  
The tax compression provision in HB 3 is a negative aspect of the bill 
because it plays favorites with property-wealthy districts instead of 
promoting fairness and putting “the same equal effort into supporting 
public education.”128   
Some may question the significance of this section.129  Why does it 
matter that some school districts can lower their property taxes at  
a rate faster and more significantly than other schools?130  If a district 
pays more taxes, they should be able to reap the exclusive benefits,  
right?131  For those who want to ignore the problems others face, this 
 
gov-greg-abbott-signs-116-billion-school-finance-measure-law/ [https://perma.cc/8JPK-6ELX] 
(reporting lawmakers’ estimations that HB 3 “will lower tax rates by an average of 8 cents per $100 
dollar valuation in 2020 and 13 cents in 2021.”). 
124. See id. (reporting HB 3’s tax reforms will provide “a tax cut of $200 for the owner of 
the $250,000 home in 2020 and $325 in 2021.”).  
125. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (suggesting HB 3’s tax reforms will reduce the amount 
available for the state to fund public education). 
126. See id. (“[R]educ[ing] tax rates each year will increase the state’s share of education 
funding.  However, it will also make it harder for the state to make future investments in the 
classroom as more and more state dollars will be needed to ensure funding stays level as tax rates 
decline.”). 
127. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (“Children 
who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially 
equal opportunity to have access to educational funds.”). 
128. See Villanueva, supra note 112 (highlighting the need for all districts to play a role in 
reforming public education funding in Texas). 
129. See Svitek, supra note 123 (quoting Governor Greg Abbott on HB 3’s passage: “We 
did something that was considered to be highly improbable, and that is to be able to transform 
public education in the state of Texas without a court order forcing us to do so.”). 
130. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (holding that adequate educational funding is 
“required if the state is to educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of 
knowledge statewide.”). 
131. See McKenzie, supra note 111 (stating the voting requirements of district tax rates 
under HB 3). 
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view may make perfect sense—but it is not justified.132  A district’s tax 
base comes from the values of individuals’ private property, but it also 
comes from commercial property value in the area and revenue generated 
from these wealthy areas is not always the claimable achievement of 
families that live in them.133  Where children grow up and what school 
district they become a part of is usually happenstance.134  Families do 
not always have the means to relocate to a “better” school district, and 
there is no guarantee parents will be involved enough in their children’s 
education to take action concerning this issue.135  Children do not control 
which school district they are brought up in; mere luck should not 
determine the quality of education they receive.136  If, we as a Texan 
community believe in this maxim, our community and government 
leaders need to grapple with questions of inequality collectively.137   
B. Changes to the Recapture Program  
One significant modification to the Texas school finance system made 
possible by the Edgewood138 cases is the introduction of a system called 
“recapture.”139  Recapture involves property-wealthy school districts 
sharing their property tax revenues with lower income districts or with 
the state to redistribute the funds.140  School districts that generate over 
$700,000 must participate in recapture.141  Property-wealthy school 
districts and those who have a stake in the matter often view recapture as 
 
132. See Svitek, supra note 123 (quoting Governor Greg Abbott on HB 3’s passage: “You 
could not overstate the magnitude of the law that I’m about to sign because this is a monumental 
moment in public education history in the state of Texas.”). 
133. Hegar, supra note 87, at 7 (“[H]igh property value isn’t necessarily a function of 
residential real estate values.”). 
134.  See generally id. (referring to a child’s inability to choose which school district they 
prefer to go to school in). 
135. Id. at 12 (indicating the number of students classified as economically disadvantaged 
is increasing).  
136. See id. at 7 (suggesting a student’s zip code should not determine the quality of 
education they receive).  
137. See id. at 5 (criticizing the efforts of our community and local government regarding 
their efforts in ceasing inequality within our education system).  
138. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
139. Litigation Saga, supra note 19, at 523 (explaining the origination of recapture). 
140. Id. (detailing the requirements of the system of recapture).  
141. See id. at 523–524 (detailing how the “state system would be enriched” if recapture is 
mandated for school districts with over $700,000, a level exceeded by more than ten percent of 
school districts.) 
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a negative aspect of school finance that must be remedied.142  These 
districts see their recapture payment increase and perhaps feel the 
payments they must make are unjust.143  Some criticisms of recapture 
are that in many cases it will result in higher local property taxes, it causes 
a “de facto cap” on school expenditures, and it is possible wealthier 
schools will stop taxing themselves at higher rates as they are essentially 
paying more for other districts.144  However, recapture has been very 
efficient in decreasing inequalities among Texas school districts.145  
Before the institution of the recapture system, the 100 wealthiest school 
districts averaged nine times the funding as the 100 poorest schools.146  
As of 2018, the top 100 wealthiest school districts only have 1.26 times 
as much funding as the 100 least wealthy schools.147   
One concerning change regarding the effect of HB 3 on the state 
finance system includes lowering recapture payments by an estimated 
$3.6 billion over the next two years.148  This reduction in recapture is 
projected to be achieved using a variety of methods.149  First, HB 3 will 
change the way recapture is calculated.150  Prior to HB 3, recapture was 
calculated by measuring equalized wealth levels.151  One criticism of that 
method is recapture and non-recapture districts were treated differently 
 
142. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a 
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-get-
distracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma 
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] [hereinafter Don’t Get Distracted] (analyzing and identifying the pitfalls and 
criticisms of the system of recapture). 
143. See id. (opining that wealthy districts become discouraged with increased payments 
and do not see the value or return in them).  
144. See Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 499, 503 (1991) (exploring the possible remedies of an inefficient school finance system 
and considering the ramifications of those remedies).  
145. See Don’t Get Distracted, supra note 142 (noting the system of recapture has “leveled 
the playing field” and has given more students the “chance to compete and succeed in life.”). 
146. See id. (“Before recapture, the 100 wealthiest school districts had, on average, nine 
times as much funding as the 100 lowest wealth districts.”). 
147. Id. 
148. See Recapture Formula Changes and Reductions Under House Bill 3, TEX. EDUC. 
AGENCY (July 25, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20Recapture%20pur 
suant%20to%20House%20Bill%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YGY-VPSU] [hereinafter Recapture 
Formula Changes] (identifying funding implications of passing HB 3).  
149. Id. 
150. Id. (“The calculation of recapture is now based on local revenue in excess of 
entitlement instead of equalized wealth levels . . . .”). 
151. Id. (distinguishing the new calculation method compared to the old one). 
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because non-recapture districts did not benefit from the “Available 
School Fund” the same way recapture schools did.152  Now, recapture 
calculations will be based on local revenue in excess of a school district’s 
entitlement level.153  The second way recapture will be reduced is 
through increasing entitlement amounts; examples of these allotments are 
increased money for special education and dual language.154  Since 
recapture calculations no longer count entitlements for wealthier schools 
as part of their recapture payments, those schools ultimately pay less.155  
The third method for decreasing recapture payments is to outright lower 
property taxes.156  Lowering taxes will always be welcoming news to 
many, but schools need a sustainable source of funding.157   
Whittling away at this source of funding will only make it more 
difficult to meet the needs of children, teachers, and staff.158  While 
districts that must make high recapture payments get relief from this bill, 
it comes at a cost.159  Now that the state is removing this source of 
funding, the state is putting the onus on itself to replace that loss of 
funding.160  Unfortunately, the plan for the state to make up the 
difference in the future is unreliable.161  Possible dips in the economy 
and the pressures of appeasing multiple parties when budget planning 
contributes to the turbulent nature of the Legislature.162  Although the 
 
152. Id. (addressing the criticism of the old method of calculating recapture). 
153. Id. 
154. See id. (explaining the creation of new allotments and expansion of old allotments). 
155. See id. (recognizing how HB 3 school districts are treated more equitably and how 
districts will only pay for recapture on the amount above their formula entitlement). 
156. Id. 
157. See Figueroa, supra note 106 (emphasizing HB 3’s focus on lowering property taxes 
as misplaced). 
158. See id. (expressing the negative impact attributed to lowering property taxes and how 
its effect will be harmful to schools in the future by “adding more pressure on other parts of the 
budget.”). 
159. See Hannah Elsaadi, The Cost of Education: An in Depth Look into Texas’s Education 
Funding System over the Last Two Decades, 2 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 341, 353, 377 (2015) 
(analyzing how the differences in size and wealth make it difficult to create efficiency). 
160. See Figueroa, supra note 106 (stating the state’s burden under HB 3 is large and will 
be even larger by 2021). 
161. See generally Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 356 (recognizing the Texas Legislature’s 
efforts in finding solutions to remedy the lack of school funding have proven to be unsuccessful). 
162. See History of LWVTX Public Education Finance, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF 
TEX., https://my.lwv.org/texas/history-lwvtx-public-education-finance-action [https://perma.cc/ 
ZW68-RAVN] (noting the consequences of the economic downturn in 2008–2011).  See generally 
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Legislature may have the best intentions to supply funding, without a 
more concrete plan, schools relying on revenue from recapture may get 
the raw end of the deal.163  One positive change to the recapture formula 
is that it will now use current year values rather than prior year values.164  
Using prior year values was problematic because it contributed to budget 
instability.165   
C. HB 3 Lacks a Sustainable Source of Funding  
In many ways, HB 3 is a step in the right direction for public school 
finance, but lawmakers should not become complacent.166  Increases in 
funding are not guaranteed beyond 2021 because the bill relies heavily 
on nonrecurring sources of funding.167  This legislative session, school 
finance was one of the most important issues discussed.168  This was 
because underfunded Texas schools, underpaid Texas school employees, 
and other interest groups put a significant amount of pressure on 
lawmakers to address the problem.169  Without that significant pressure 
or a court order, the Texas Legislature will likely be less willing to 
 
Figueroa, supra note 106 (describing the pressures on the budget that will occur as the state puts 
the onus on itself in order to relieve property taxes). 
163. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 356, 359 (describing instances where the Legislature 
attempted to find a solution to education financing and failed). 
164. See Recapture Formula Changes, supra note 148 (demonstrating how the prior method 
created budget instability and deficits). 
165. See id. (describing how budget instability, including budget deficits, were caused by 
the old method of recapture). 
166. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Sustainability, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS 
NEWS (June 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Public-
education-reforms-lack-financial-13969323.php [https://perma.cc/C3HC-EG2C] (urging state law 
makers to adopt public education reforms that will be warranted in the years down the road and 
reiterating public education “should not be dealt with only” when “in crisis mode.”). 
167. See id. (introducing further cause for concern given the state’s history of giving and 
taking away funds in the past). 
168. Id. 
169. See Rebekah Allen, Texas Lawmaker Who Almost Quit After Failed School Overhaul 
Bill Back with Transformative Plan, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:45 PM), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2019/04/24/texas-lawmaker-who-almost-quit-after-
failed-school-overhaul-bill-back-with-transformative-plan/ [https://perma.cc/Z3ME-466E] (noting 
the pressure to deliver, especially considering how the 2009 Legislature gave teachers a modest 
salary increase, but then completely took it away with the cuts made in 2011). 
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increase funding again on its own.170  Without a sustainable and long-
term plan to continue funding for teachers and new allotments, it will 
become increasingly harder for the legislature to pay for the changes HB 
3 has made.171  These difficulties arise due to changing demographics 
and inflation.172  Funding education may easily become less of a priority 
to the Legislature as they have many significant issues to deal with, and 
all compete for funding.173   
The risk that funding from HB 3 will be discontinued after 2021 is not 
mere speculation.174  Texas history reveals many instances where state 
funding was granted and then repealed a few years later.175  In 2006, 
Governor Rick Perry called a special session for school finance to find a 
solution for the lack of funding.176  Two months prior, the Texas 
Supreme Court found the Texas school finance system 
unconstitutional.177  Governor Perry introduced the Educational 
Excellence and Equity Plan (EEAEP).178  This plan included granting 
relief to taxpayers by lowering the residential cap to $1.25 per $100 
property valuation.179  The plan also aimed to eliminate recapture and 
split a district’s tax base for separate caps on commercial and residential 
 
170. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Sustainability, supra note 166 (stating 
that without a court order forcing them to do so, state lawmakers have not been very good at 
addressing the issue of school funding). 
171. See id. (reiterating the fear lawmakers will cut large amounts of funding to public 
education as they have similarly done in the past when crisis strikes). 
172. See id. (describing how shifting priorities in the Legislature have failed students in the 
past); see also Figueroa, supra note 106 (detailing how HB 3 accounts for inflation). 
173. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 342 (acknowledging the Texas Legislature failed to 
prioritize education finance for decades, and, as a result, schools have been negatively affected by 
the Legislature’s “trial and error” approach); see also Public Education Reforms Lack Financial 
Stability, supra note 166 (asserting that other priorities may take attention away from school 
financing). 
174. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 355–69 (detailing how Texas’s history shows a myriad 
of failed attempts to address issues with the finance system). 
175. See, e.g., id. at 359–62 (recounting the events leading up to the significant cuts to the 
education budget in 2011).  
176. Id. at 361.  
177. See Neely v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist, 176 S.W.3d 746, 800 (Tex. 
2005) (declaring increased school funding must be accompanied by structural changes); see also 
Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 361 (underlining the unconstitutionality of the state property scheme 
used for public school funding).   
178. See Elsaadi, supra note 159, at 361 (crediting Governor Perry for his proposed 
Educational Excellence and Equity Plan as a possible remedy to the finance problem). 
179. Id. 
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property.180  To make up for lost revenue from the property taxes, a 
business margins tax and increased cigarette tax was implemented.181  
The EEAEP included a provision for Additional State Aid for Tax 
Reduction (ASATR).182  The ASATR’s goal was to account for money 
school districts lost as a result of the EEAEP that was not covered by the 
business margins and cigarette taxes.183  Unfortunately, these taxes were 
not enough to offset the property tax losses, and the state had to utilize 
ASATR much more than it expected.184  These unexpected expenditures 
contributed to a need for extensive cuts to the education budget in 
2011.185   
1. Watching History Repeat 
HB 3 is similar in many respects to Rick Perry’s Educational 
Excellence and Equity Plan and may have similar negative consequences 
unless further action is taken.186  One of the main ways the bills are 
similar is the emphasis on lowering property taxes and reducing or 
eliminating recapture payments.187  Provisions like these are popular 
with taxpayers; however, they pull school finance bills in too many 
directions.188  Just as HB 3 puts the onus on the state to make up the 
 
180. See id. (listing the main components of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan). 
181. See id. (describing the financial strategies employed by the state to help supplement 
public school funding). 
182. Id. at 362 (2015). 
183. See id. (detailing how the budget shortfalls caused by the EEAEP would be covered 
by ASATR). 
184. See id. (addressing the financial consequences public schools faced in the aftermath of 
the EEAEP). 
185. Id. 
186. Compare id. (stating the main tenants of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan), 
with Figueroa, supra note 106 (highlighting the lack of sustainable sources of funding for Texas 
public schools stemming from HB 3). 
187. See generally 2004 Special Session on School Finance, PLANO INDEP. SCH. DIST. 
(Apr. 22, 2004), https://www.pisd.edu/site/Default.aspx?PageID=1740 [https://perma.cc/SPG2-
8FHL] (extrapolating the key aspects of the Educational Excellence and Equity Plan). 
188. See Ross Ramsey, Analysis: There’s a Reason Texas Governors Keep Failing to Lower 
Property Taxes, TEX. TRIB.  (Jan. 17, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2018/ 
01/17/analysis-theres-reason-texas-governors-keep-failing-lower-property-tax/ 
[https://perma.cc/MX64-GVW6] (describing the political importance of lower property taxes to the 
residents of Texas).  See generally Kiah Collier, 2011 Budget Cuts Still Hampering Schools, TEX. 
TRIB. (Aug. 31, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/08/31/texas-schools-still-
feeling-2011-budget-cuts/ [https://perma.cc/E77Q-7C55] (detailing how districts are still tackling 
staffing cuts, swelling class sizes, and flat test scores aggravated by the 2011 budget cuts). 
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revenue losses caused by reductions in property taxes and recapture 
payments, the EEAEP did the same and had disastrous results.189  The 
Legislature may mean well, but ultimately, consistent funding requires a 
tangible, efficient plan for generating revenue because when outside 
variables negatively affect the state’s budget, Texas schools should have 
more to fall back on than what amounts to an IOU.190  In 2011, the state 
cut 5.4 billion dollars from the education budget.191  Although the state 
tried to make up for the cuts in subsequent years, it never fully removed 
the lingering effects.192   
In 2013, the state granted a $3.4 billion increase, but it was not enough 
to help Texas schools recover from the negative effects of the 2011 
budget cuts.193  In 2015, school staffing, classroom sizes, per student 
funding, and test scores were all still negatively impacted and indicative 
that despite the remedial increases, school districts were still inadequately 
funded.194  Public school staffing was still lower by 3,700 teachers, while 
enrollment steadily increased by more than 220,000 students.195  Texas 
was also still experiencing a substantial increase in waivers to allow 
campuses to exceed the twenty-two student class size limit.196  High 
stakes testing scores saw little to no improvement with success rates in 
the seventieth percentile, while many school districts had still not 
achieved pre-2011 per student funding.197  Considering the national 
average for amount spent per student on education was $12,040 in 2015, 
 
189. See Aliyya Swaby, Teacher Raises and All-day Pre-K: Here’s What’s in the Texas 
Legislature’s Landmark School Finance Bill, TEX. TRIB. (May 24, 219, 9:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/24/texas-school-finance-bill-here-are-details/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8XDC-7CH6] (reporting how the budget cuts are accounted). 
190. See PLANO INDEP. SCH. DIST., supra note 187 (identifying the need for a long-term 
school financing plan). 
191. Collier, supra note 188. 
192. See id. (acknowledging that schools continued to struggle years after the 2011 budget 
cut).  
193. Id. 
194. See id. (reporting how public schools are still struggling with 2011 budget cuts in the 
education system despite the Legislature’s attempt to adequately allocate funds). 
195. Id. 
196. See id. (“The state still is approving far more waivers allowing elementary schools to 
exceed a 22-student class size limit established in 1984.  Last year, the total number of campuses 
requesting waivers exceeded 2,100, according to state data; In the five school years leading up to 
the 2011 budget cuts, it never topped 1,375.”). 
197. Id.  
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and Texas was spending $9,559 per student, pre-2011 spending was a low 
benchmark.198   
2. Teachers and Students are Affected by a Lack of Sustainable Funding 
In addition to affecting students, a lack of reliable and sustainable 
funding also negatively affects teachers and other school employees.199  
Because HB 3 requires districts to set aside a certain percentage of money 
for increases in salary, the districts’ hands will be tied if in two years they 
are unable to afford the new raises.200  As a result of this instability, 
many school districts are attempting to be conservative with school 
employees’ raises, and school employees are not getting the economic 
help they were anticipating from the bill.201   
Many school employees expressed their excitement for receiving a 
salary increase.202  However, some have also expressed disappointment 
they did not qualify for an increase or did not get the raise they expected 
to receive.203  HB 3 requires school districts increase salaries for certain 
staff as laid out in Section 48.051(c) of the Education Code.204  The code 
states: 
 
198. See id. (noting Texas is in the bottom one-third in the nation for per-student funding). 
199. See Aliyya Swaby, With Conflicting Budget Estimates, Will Texas Teachers Get the 
Pay Raises They Anticipated?, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2019/07/03/teacher-pay-raises-school-district-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/4RKK-65SV] 
(describing difficult choices districts must make regarding funding notwithstanding awareness that 
in two years, the funding may change or no longer exist). 
200. See id. (emphasizing the substantial contrast between earlier district budget estimates 
and calculations the districts did themselves while reporting that some districts are coming up 
short). 
201. See, e.g., id. (demonstrating how Houston ISD’s 3.5% raise equates to less than a 
$100.00 raise per paycheck). 
202. See, e.g., Corbett Smith, Texas Is Spending Billions More on Education but Teachers 
May Not Get the Raises They Expect, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 30, 2019), https://www.dallas 
news.com/news/education/2019/06/30/texas-is-spending-billions-more-on-education-but-teachers 
-may-not-get-the-raises-they-expect/ [https://perma.cc/H4QN-RLCE] (discussing the 
misconception teachers would get a uniform $5,000 raise to their annual salary). 
203. See id. (detailing how the funding mandated by HB 3 will to some extent be applied 
according to the discretion of the school districts). 
204. Act of June 12, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., H.B. 3, § 1.021(c); accord Leo Lopez,  
House Bill 3 Implementation Salary Increases, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY (June 11, 2019), 
https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20House%20Bill%203%20Implementation%2 
0Salary%20Increases%206.11.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NUH-35NZ] (summarizing the funding 
allocation mandates within HB 3). 
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A school district must use at least 30 percent of the amount . . . that equals 
the product of the average daily attendance of the district multiplied by the 
amount of difference between the district’s funding under this chapter per 
student in average daily attendance for the current school year and the 
preceding school year to provide compensation increases to full-time 
employees other than administrators.205   
In addition, the funds are prioritized to classroom teachers that have more 
than five years’ experience.206  Although school districts must follow 
section 48.051 of the Education Code, they are given considerable leeway 
on how to distribute the funds.207  The funds themselves do not need to 
be given as a salary increase, as districts have the option of increasing 
benefits instead.208  For example, Frisco ISD is increasing medical 
premium contributions by $25 more per employee.209  Many speculated 
the salary increases would be a uniform $5,000 across the board, but this 
was not the case.210  Because of the way the salary increase formula is 
built, some schools will get much more funding for this purpose than 
others, and the result is that many teachers will not get much of a salary 
increase at all.211  School districts that are allotted more money under the 
formula are able to give significant increases such as Barbers Hill ISD 
(outside of Houston), the first district in Texas to raise starting teacher 
pay to $60,000.212  Other districts who are less favored by the formula—
like Plano ISD (in the Dallas area)—are only able to offer a 2.5% pay 
raise to teachers with fewer than 6 years’ experience and a 3% increase 
 
205. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 48.051 (2019). 
206. See Lopez, supra note 204 (confirming 75% of funds will go to teachers with more 
than five years of experience). 
207. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 202 (expressing that although teachers must receive a 
portion of the new funds schools are receiving, the school districts will be able to decide how to 
distribute them to a certain degree as well as what to do with any funds in excess of the mandated 
minimum). 
208. See id. (acknowledging how large contributions to employee insurance premiums in 
Texas serve as a loophole to giving school employees a definite pay increase).   
209. See id. (noting that spending an overwhelming $1.8 million dollars only equates to an 
insignificant “raise” for school employees). 
210. See id. (recounting the legislative history of HB 3 and explaining that the uniform 
$5,000 was considered as a viable plan but was then defeated in the House). 
211. See id. (“A third of the state’s districts and charters won’t get more than $450,000 in 
additional formula funding . . . .”). 
212. Id. 
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to teachers with more than 6 years’ experience.213  Additionally, there 
are concerns about the longevity of the funding for salary increases and 
some are fearful if the state experiences economic hardship, teacher and 
other school employees’ salaries will be affected.214  Prior to HB 3, the 
last time teachers received a material increase was in 2009.215  Due to 
the economic recession, the Legislature then cut $5.4 billion from the 
education budget just two years later in 2011.216   
Teachers and other school employees are long overdue for salary 
increases, and the HB 3 salary increases are absolutely welcome.217  
However, the salary increase provided for in HB 3 does nothing to 
improve the disparity in teacher and staff salaries between districts.218  
In fact, the HB 3 salary increase may exacerbate these issues.219  
Wealthier districts already paying their teachers at the national average 
will be able to increase salaries even higher while poorer districts will 
struggle to pay their teachers the national average.220  The effect is that 
wealthier districts are better able to attract valuable employees and retain 
them longer.221   
 
213. Id. 
214. See Julie Chang, Why Some Aren’t Sold on Giving Teachers a $5,000 Raise, 
STATESMAN (Jan. 17, 2019, 6:17 PM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20190117/why-some-
people-arent-sold-on-giving-texas-teachers-5000-raise [https://perma.cc/3DS3-AH2N] (“[A]n 
economic downturn could easily eliminate funding for teacher pay.”). 
215. See id. (explaining how the raises given to teachers in 2009 were undercut by budget 
cuts in 2011 which caused teachers to be laid off). 
216. See id. (describing how budget cuts during the recession lead to attrition); see also 
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEX., supra note 162 (detailing how the 2013 Legislature was 
under pressure to fix education financing). 
217. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF TEX., supra note 162 (providing a timeline of 
education finance in Texas); see also Aliyya Swaby, Can Pay Raises Help Rural Texas Districts 
Like Buffalo Retain Teachers?, TEX. TRIB. (May 17, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune. 
org/2019/05/17/texas-teacher-pay-raises-small-districts-retain-staff/ [https://perma.cc/U4CQ-B5 
DC] [hereinafter Rural Texas Districts] (giving examples of teachers and other school staff who 
struggle to make ends meet). 
218. See Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217 (depicting the difficulties one district has 
attempting to compete with districts that use higher salaries to attract employees). 
219. See id. (“[C]ompetitors will also have more money to spend on bonuses and raises, 
making it challenging for the tiny district to come out on top.”). 
220. See id. (predicting one small school district will still struggle to compete since the 
funding will be distributed equally to all school districts if HB 3 passes). 
221. See Desiree Carver-Thomas & Linda Darling Hammond, Teacher Turnover:  
Why It Matters and What We Can Do About It, LEARNING POL’Y INST. v–vi (Aug. 2017), 
https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/Teacher_Turnover_REPORT.pd 
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In Buffalo ISD, the base pay for a starting teacher is $15,000 less than 
the state average.222  The superintendent of the district drives the school 
bus every day for three hours in the morning and three hours in the 
afternoon because the district has struggled to find a licensed bus driver 
willing to take on the position.223  This occurrence is worrisome, 
considering the school district in Buffalo, as in many other small towns, 
is the main employer.224  Though Buffalo ISD will be able to increase 
employee salaries under HB 3, it will still be pressed to attract new 
teachers and fill positions when neighboring districts are also able to pay 
more.225  Differences in pay contribute to an “employment drought” 
problem.226  One concern is this disparity in pay ultimately affects the 
quality of education children receive.227  Buffalo ISD has also had 
trouble filling bilingual teaching positions, which affects the quality of 
English language learning students’ educations.228   
In sum, while salary increases are a positive aspect of HB 3, in many 
cases they will not be enough to decrease the pay gap between poor 
school districts and the national teacher salary average; they do not 
address the disparity in pay between Texas school districts, and the 
sustainability of funding for these increases is in question.229   
 
f [https://perma.cc/5C4B-3XHP] (reporting national teacher turnover rates are 50% higher in Title 
1 schools who serve lower income populations and recommending increased compensation 
packages as a means of curbing the turnover). 
222. Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217. 
223. See id. (emphasizing this is not an uncommon occurrence throughout rural Texas 
districts).  
224. Id. 
225. See id. (comparing with how other school districts will also receive funding for raises 
and bonuses under HB 3). 
226. See id. (stating how one school district was hoping for more money to recruit teachers 
and end the employment draught); see also Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 32 
(“[T]eachers in districts with a maximum teaching salary greater than $72,000 are 20–31% less 
likely to leave their schools than those with maximum salaries under $60,000.”). 
227. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at vii, 1 (describing the heavy toll 
teacher turnovers have on students even if the teacher just moves to another school, because in a 
pinch, schools will often hire inexperienced or unqualified teachers; this, coupled with the 
instability students experience, impacts their learning). 
228. See Rural Texas Districts, supra note 217 (addressing the growing need for bilingual 
teachers as the number of Hispanic students has more than doubled since 2003). 
229. See generally id. (discussing disparities between a rural Texas district and the national 
average compared to other Texas districts); see Chang, supra note 214 (discussing disparities 
between Texas districts and the national average where “an economic downturn could easily 
eliminate funding for teacher pay.”). 
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IV.    WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR GUIDANCE?  
In the United States, people are accustomed to viewing the country as 
a leader in the world, at the forefront of success.230  However, the United 
States trails behind other countries when it comes to providing students 
with a quality education.231  In international rankings, the United States 
is near the bottom middle of the list and is ranked behind countries such 
as Estonia and Slovenia.232  This difference in quality has continued 
more than fifty years after the official end of segregation.233  In 2013, 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress showed the average 
Black student in the twelfth grade was reading at a level equivalent to the 
average White student in the eighth grade.234   
A. Nationally 
The problems with our education system have not been ignored; the 
United States has attempted to address these issues at the national and 
statewide level.235  At the national level, presidents have taken action, 
such as the “No Child Left Behind Act” initiated by President Bush in 
2001 and “Race to the Top” initiated by President Obama in 2012.236  
U.S. courts have favored the idea states should be free to serve as 
laboratories for policy which, if successful, may lead to the adoption of 
these laws by other states or even the federal government.237  While the 
 
230. See Is America Still the Leader of the Free World? PBS, https://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/third-rail/episodes/episode-3-should-america-be-the-worlds-cop/america-leader-free-world/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q4DR-67XQ] (reporting 67% of Americans consider the United States to be the 
leader of the free world). 
231. Jal Mehta, Why American Education Fails: And How Lessons from Abroad Could 
Improve It, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 106 (2013). 
232. See id. (“U.S. schools still languish in the middle of international rankings . . . .”). 
233. See id. at 105, 106 (2013) (explaining the average black twelfth grader scores on an 
equivalent level as the average white eighth grader on the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress). 
234. See id. (“[H]alf a century after the end of official segregation, huge gaps continue to 
divide students by race and class, with the average black 12th grader scoring in reading at a level 
equivalent to the average white eighth grader on the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress . . . .”). 
235. See id. (referring to recent federal level education reforms initiated by American 
presidents). 
236. Id. at 105–07 (2013). 
237. James A. Gardner, The “States-as-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional 
Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 477 (1996). 
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national programs have helped in limited respects they have also led to 
more problems.238  The Obama administration’s Race to the Top 
program yielded some positive results.239  This grant-based program 
incentivized states to make improvements to their education systems by 
raising standards and emphasizing a focus on college and career 
readiness.240  Through the program, forty-six states and the District of 
Columbia submitted comprehensive reform plans, $4 billion was granted 
to nineteen states, and thirty-four states modified their education laws to 
focus on enhancing college and career readiness standards.241  No Child 
Left Behind has a great name, but is well-cited for creating more 
problems than solutions.242  No Child Left Behind focused heavily on 
accountability by requiring schools to measure and document how 
students performed on testing and instituting more severe consequences 
when they did not perform well.243  The Act was helpful because it 
required schools to break down the performance rates by race, an area 
that lacked accountability in many schools.244  Negative consequences 
of the Act included increased pressure on teachers to teach to the test, 
 
238. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105–06 (explaining that while U.S. national initiatives 
have “generated progress in some areas,” U.S. schools still rank in the middle of international 
educational rankings). 
239. See Race to the Top, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/ 
education/k-12/race-to-the-top [https://perma.cc/3VFT-TUN6] (recognizing the Race to the Top 
initiative “created robust plans” and dedicated billions of dollars to address K-12 education reform).   
240. See id. (stressing the program’s four key areas of reform: (1) Development of rigorous 
standards and better assessments; (2) Adoption of better data systems to provide schools, teachers, 
and parents with information about student progress; (3) Support for teachers and school leaders to 
become more effective; and (4) increased emphasis and resources for the rigorous interventions 
needed to turn around the lowest performing schools). 
241. Id. 
242. See Valerie Strauss, No Child Left Behind’s Test-Based Policies Failed.  Will Congress 
Keep Them Anyway?, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
answer-sheet/wp/2015/02/13/no-child-left-behinds-test-based-policies-failed-will-congress-keep-
them-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/N6TC-QEDR] (indicating issues caused by the Act’s specific 
focus on accountability and test-based assessments included inequitable distribution for 
opportunities for children to grow, learn and thrive); see also Christopher W. Holiman, Leaving No 
Law Student Left Behind: Learning to Learn in the Age of No Child Left Behind, 58 HOWARD L.J. 
195, 205–07 (2014) (outlining the harsh reality of the No Child Left Behind initiative’s 
consequential effects in improvised and high-minority communities).  
243. See Holiman, supra note 242, at 204–05 (explaining how the program’s standards 
overlook the problem and punish teachers for bad results). 
244. Id. 
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penalties disproportionally impacting communities of color, and 
discouraging students who did not perform well on high stakes tests.245   
Despite efforts to address problems with education, inequalities persist 
and U.S. school rankings have not improved.246  The American 
education system was developed during the Progressive Era with a 
particular focus on White students, the majority of whom were able to 
graduate high school.247  This reason, among others, is why our 
education system produces comparatively worse results than other 
countries.248  In the 1960s, a high school education was good enough to 
enter into middle-class occupations, such as manufacturing, and some 
scholars posit that, as a country, we were content with that for quite some 
time.249  Our current education system was not created for students of 
color, and, as a result, is not equipped to correct issues in our current 
education system.250  This is especially true in Texas where the vestiges 
of segregation and discrimination affect how we finance education.251   
B. Internationally  
So, how do more successful countries in the area of education approach 
education?252  Canada, Japan, Finland, Singapore, and South Korea all 
rank higher than the United States on the International Student 
 
245. Id. at 202–03. 
246. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105–06 (analyzing how reforms have led to progress in 
some areas, but the U.S. education system still ranks in the middle of international rankings). 
247. See id. at 107–08 (expounding on the ways the formation of the contemporary 
educational system failed to include concerns particular to non-White students). 
248. See id. at 105, 108 (2013) (linking the formation of the contemporary American 
education system to its current outcomes, especially when compared to other countries). 
249. See id. (concluding Americans tolerated the system because most White students 
graduated and were qualified for these positions, regardless of how much they actually learned in 
school). 
250. See id. (reinforcing how the Progressive Era’s focus on White students inherently 
excluded non-White students). 
251. See generally Arnoldo De Leon & Robert Calvert, Segregation, TEX. ST. HIST.  
ASS’N, https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/segregation [https://perma.cc/5FEW-J8CK] 
(summarizing the history of school segregation in Texas and noting how “[i]n the early twentieth 
century, Black and Mexican schools faced lamentable conditions endemic in an antiquated 
educational system, and educational reforms of the Progressive era did not improve matters.”). 
252. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105, 107 (emphasizing the need for the United States to 
borrow the different ideas countries currently atop the international ranking utilize in their 
educational system). 
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Assessment, and each have similarities in their approach to education.253  
Rather than focusing disproportionally on accountability, these countries’ 
approach to education focus on creating the “profession of education.”254  
This involves an active attempt at attracting the most talented graduates 
into the teaching profession and providing them extensive training.255  
As a result, the profession of teaching in these countries is considered a 
very distinguished occupation and garners significant respect.256  Due to 
significant training, there is less need for extensive accountability, and 
teachers have greater freedom to teach their subjects as they see fit rather 
than a one-size-fits-all mold.257  Another thing these countries all have 
in common is that their education systems are all supported by a 
significant welfare system.258   
It is easy to see why there are many arguments against using 
comparisons of education systems in other countries.259  The United 
States is uniquely situated in many aspects, so looking at what other 
countries do may seem to have little value.260  For example, the United 
States has a much larger land mass than many other countries and does 
not have a uniform application of many education policies because the 
states have a right to dictate education as they see fit.261  In addition, the 
 
253. Id. 
254. See id. (comparing other countries’ commitment to making education a strong 
profession, whereas the United States focuses on accountability). 
255. See id. (“[Other countries] choose their teachers from among their most talented 
graduates, train them extensively, create opportunities for them to collaborate with their peers 
within and across schools to improve their practice, provide them the external supports that they 
need to do their work well, and underwrite all these efforts with a strong welfare state.”). 
256. See, e.g., id. at 105, 112 (2013) (sharing how teaching in Finland is a highly selective 
program which only accepts one in every ten applicants). 
257. See Holiman, supra note 242, at 202–03 (2014) (sharing the way standardized tests 
impede a teacher’s discretion and the students through a one-size-fits-all method). 
258. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 105, 107 (detailing how other countries create peer 
collaborative opportunities across schools and provide external support to teachers, all funded from 
the welfare state program). 
259. See Sean Cavanaugh, U.S. Education Pressured by International Comparisons,  
EDUC. WK. (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2012/01/12/16overview.h31.html, 
[https://perma.cc/BMB5-7MFZ] (describing how a single-policy analysis does not take into 
account the role culture plays in education). 
260. See, e.g., id. (illustrating how the unique culture in Japan plays an important factor in 
their education system). 
261. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 109 (noting how the decentralized education system in 
the United States limits the federal government’s ability to establish uniform teaching standards 
throughout the nation).   
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United States has an ethnically diverse population and a relatively recent 
history of attempting to overcome issues of slavery and discrimination in 
the education system.262  These differences complicate the United 
States’ ability to apply methods used in more homogenous countries.263  
However, there is value in analyzing successful education models 
because they can change our perspective regarding valuing and funding 
education in Texas and the United States.264   
V.    SOLUTIONS 
A. The Need for a Change in Thinking 
An examination of school finance in Texas shows despite efforts to 
improve education by funding it properly, there is significant resistance 
to funding methods that require people to expend resources on something 
they will not be able to benefit from in the short term.265  Evidence of 
this idea can be seen in HB 3’s resistance to recapture, which scaled back 
recapture payments for school districts and laid the foundation for further 
scale back in the future.266   
Evidence can also be found in resistance to taxes.267  In 2019, 
Proposition 4 passed in Texas.268  Proposition 4 is a Texas Constitutional 
 
262. See Mehta, supra note 231, at 106 (acknowledging how huge gaps continue to divide 
students by race and class even after the United States ended segregation half a century ago). 
263. See Cavanaugh, supra note 259 (detailing factors that differentiate the U.S.’s 
educational system from other countries, such as societal and cultural norms). 
264. See id. (echoing the need to understand how different countries produce higher 
educational results and to prevent the United States from falling behind). 
265. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a 
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-get-
distracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma 
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] (noting the advantages and benefits of paying taxes in Texas are not immediate, 
but to support the future). 
266. See Leo Lopez, Recapture Formula Changes and Reductions Under House Bill 3,  
TEX. EDUC. AGENCY (July 25, 2019), https://tea.texas.gov/sites/default/files/TAA%20-%20 
Recapture%20pursuant%20to%20House%20Bill%203.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YGY-VPSU] 
(detailing how the passing of HB 3 will reduce recapture in the next biennium by $3.6 billion). 
267. See Alex Samuels, Texas Voters Approve State Income Tax Ban, Most Other 
Constitutional Amendments, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/ 
11/05/texas-constitutional-amendments-uniform-election-results-2019/ [https://perma.cc/BM9M-
M9K4] (recognizing seventy-five percent of Texans voted against state income tax). 
268. See id. (noting the state income tax ban, Proposition 4, proclaimed victory within hours 
of the polls closing).   
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Amendment eliminating the possibility of imposing a state income tax on 
individuals, unless a future amendment states otherwise.269  Although 
there are many valid arguments in favor of this outcome, the amendment 
removes funding possibilities the Texas education system could have 
benefited from.270  Now that Proposition 4 has passed, there is little 
opportunity for creative legislation taxing ultra-wealthy individuals a 
significant amount for the benefit of education.271  There is also a lost 
opportunity to have valuable debate in the future about how to fund public 
services such as education, transportation, and health care.272  The 
amendment was also framed in a way to unfairly instill fear in Texan 
voters.273  Proposition 4 was framed in a way that created alarm and may 
have led some voters to believe if they did not vote for it, they would 
become subject to an income tax.274  The Texas Constitution already 
ensures voters retain control over whether or not to ever create an income 
tax which makes the proposition unnecessary.275  States without an 
income tax rely on 39% of revenue from property taxes, while states with 
an income tax rely on only 31% of revenue from property taxes.276  In 
addition, states that have sales, income, and property taxes have more 
 
269. Id. 
270. See Dick Lavine, CPPP Opposes Proposition 4 on the Statewide Ballot This Fall: 
Harmful Proposition Would Tie the Hands of Future Texans, EVERY TEXAN (July 2019), 
http://forabettertexas.org/images/IT_2019_Oppose_Prop4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4P-ELMC] 
(reiterating how the amendment would place hurdles for public services funding such as education). 
271. Cf. Id. (describing how states without an income tax lead low-income and middle-
income families to be taxed more heavily than higher-income families). 
272. See id. (stating how the passing of Proposition 4 would place further hurdles for future 
Texan generations to overcome in order to support public services such as education). 
273. See Luis Figueroa, You Don’t Need Proposition 4 to Protect You from a Texas Income 
Tax, CALLER TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019, 2:52 PM), https://www.caller.com/story/opinion/2019/10/15/ 
you-dont-need-proposition-4-protect-you-texas-income-tax/3988796002/ [https://perma.cc/6JPU-
6VDP] (“Fear is a tactic politicians use to scare and distract voters from the real threat.  This tactic 
is on full display in this November’s election in the form of Proposition 4, which would needlessly 
ban the Texas Legislature from adopting an income tax.”). 
274. See id. (“Proposition 4 is completely unnecessary and based on fake threats” while 
“[t]he real threat to the future prosperity of our state is the greater tax burden that Texas already 
places on the backs of the poor and middle class.”). 
275. See Lavine, supra note 270 (“The ‘Bullock Amendment,’ adopted in 1993 (Art. 8, sec. 
24), gives voters final control over any future income tax by requiring approval by a statewide 
referendum before an income tax could take effect. . . .  Proposition 4 would repeal the Bullock 
Amendment and its protections, leaving a complete prohibition against the Legislature ‘imposing 
a net income tax on individuals.’”). 
276. Id. 
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stable economics and are less vulnerable to economic downturn.277  
Importantly, states without an income tax take a higher proportion of 
funding from low- and middle-income families than they do of high-
income families.278  This fact is indicative legislation like Proposition 4 
is for the benefit of people with large amounts of wealth.279  Rather than 
being afraid of taxes, Texan voters need to engage in substantive debate 
about what methods of generating revenue will be beneficial for Texas in 
the years to come.280  Legislation seems to always be two steps behind 
in remedying a need for more money due to inflation and a rapidly 
growing Texas population.281   
B. Is Money the Answer? 
Many have raised the argument Texas is giving a satisfactory amount 
of funding for education because more money will not necessarily 
translate to better-quality education.282  While it is true money should be 
spent in a targeted and efficient manner, research shows money does 
matter.283  There are several factors—including money—directly 
influencing the success of a child’s education.284  Better literacy skills 
among teachers, decreased class size, and experienced teachers of five 
 
277. See id. (“States with three major sources of tax revenue can balance the advantages 
and disadvantages of each type of tax—particularly their fairness and volatility—to achieve a stable 




280. See id. (indicating the need for alternatives other than the two major sources of revenue 
Texas relies upon). 
281. See id. (opining the Legislature failed to consider future Texans’ needs). 
282. See Ronald F. Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on how and Why 
Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 465, 488 (1991) (“The research that this Article describes 
strongly supports the conventional wisdom that higher-quality schooling produces better reading 
skills among public school students and that when targeted and managed wisely, increased funding 
can improve the quality of public education.”). 
283. See, e.g., id. at 470, 483, 489 (“[N]ew studies are beginning to find evidence that 
money affects the quality of schooling and that the quality of schooling influences not only test 
scores but later earnings as well.”). 
284. See id. at 466, 484, 487, 489–90 (evidencing teacher quality maters and should also be 
a major focus for school districts because skilled teachers “are the most critical of all schooling 
inputs . . . and may positively affect a student’s test scores). 
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years or more all predict better student scores on exams.285  Arguably 
one of the most important factors is the quality of the teachers.286  
Experience and skills training are two factors that increase the quality of 
a teacher.287  Teachers with strong skills and significant experience 
affect how well students perform on tests and ensure students have a 
quality education.288  Quality teachers are unsurprisingly attracted to 
locations paying higher salaries and areas where students come from a 
higher socioeconomic status.289  Higher salaries and socioeconomic 
status both contribute to education inequities between school districts.290  
Although money spent on increasing teacher salaries in general helps 
teachers, alone it is unlikely to be effective in improving student 
performance.291  On the other hand, a study shows that increasing teacher 
salaries and incentivizing quality teachers to move to areas where student 
performance is low does help to improve student performance.292  The 
study’s credibility is increased by the fact it controls for outside factors 
that greatly influence the performance of children in school, such as 
 
285. See id. at 465, 488 (“Results show that better literacy skills . . . among teachers, fewer 
large classes, and more teachers with five or more years of experience . . . all predict better student 
test scores . . . .”). 
286. See id. at 465, 490 (suggesting teacher quality matters and should be a major focus in 
the efforts to upgrade the quality of schooling). 
287. See id. at 465, 476 (“Teachers with more years of experience produce higher student 
test scores, lower dropout rates, and higher rates of taking the SAT.”). 
288. See, e.g., id. at 465, 476, 482 (providing high school teachers with at least nine years’ 
experience positively impact students compared to non-high school teachers and teachers with less 
than five years’ experience). 
289. See id. at 465, 466 (“[E]qualizing salaries will not attract equally qualified teachers” 
to areas with lower economic status); see also Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 14 
(explaining students of color and low-income students experience a “revolving door” of less 
experienced teachers due to high turnover rates).  
290. See Ferguson, supra note 282, at 465, 466 (claiming schools with higher salaries and 
locations in wealthier neighborhoods provide more incentives and attract qualified teachers to the 
district). 
291. See id. at 465, 467 (“For the state as a whole, however, upgrading the quality of 
schooling would require more than salary differentials that rearranged how teachers distributed 
themselves across competing school districts.  Primarily, it would require measures to assist 
existing teachers in efforts to upgrade their skills, to retain talented and experienced teachers, and, 
over the longer term, to attract academically stronger candidates of all races into primary and 
secondary school teaching.”). 
292. See id. at 465, 489 (proposing a state policy allowing “districts with lower socio-
economic status” to “pay higher salaries” is necessary to ensure each school districts get their 
proportionate share of quality teachers). 
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issues with family and home environment.293  Because teacher 
experience and skill level are so critical in improving student 
performance, money spent on increasing the number and quality of 
teachers absolutely matters.294  One recommendation for improving 
Texas public school education is to spend money on improving the 
quality of teachers, such as teacher training, and to implement a policy 
incentivizing teachers to teach in lower socioeconomic districts.295   
C. Prioritizing Communities Needing Assistance 
The most recognizable program that incentivizes districts needing 
assistance is Teach For America.296  Under this model, recruited 
members enter the program committed to teaching in areas of high 
need.297  While teaching in schools, the recruits complete assignments 
and can earn their certification, serving as a significant recruitment 
incentive.298  Recruited members are required to commit to their 
assignments for two years, and then if their district makes them an offer 
to continue, they can take it, choose to leave teaching, or apply for another 
teaching job in a different district.299  While these programs fill an 
immediate need and are arguably good programs for young professionals 
to get teaching experience, they are not ideally suited for students because 
they form a bond with these teachers who often leave their learning 
environments.300  Teach For America and other similar short-term 
programs have the best of intentions, but statistics suggest they contribute 
 
293. Id. at 465, 478 (“[C]onditions in home and community environments outside of the 
school are important detriments of schooling outcomes.”). 
294. See id. at 465, 475, 489 (“Since more and better teachers can help to raise standardized 
test scores and higher salaries attract more and better teachers, money matters for raising test 
scores.”). 
295. Id. at 465, 489–90. 
296. What We Do, TEACH FOR AM., https://www.teachforamerica.org/what-we-do, 
[https://perma.cc/A24Y-QTXG] (“Teach For America is a diverse network of leaders who confront 
educational inequity by teaching for at least two years and then working with unwavering 
commitment from every sector of society to create a nation free from this injustice.”). 
297. See id. (“Teach For America recruits outstanding and diverse leaders to become TFA 
“corps members. . . . who commit to teach for two years in a low-income community . . . .”). 
298. Teaching in the Corps, TEACH FOR AM., https://www.teachforamerica.org/life-in-the-
corps/teaching-in-the-corps [https://perma.cc/ZR4X-SSA]. 
299. TEACH FOR AM., supra note 196.  
300. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 14 (recognizing teacher turnover 
affects low income minority students at a higher rate). 
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to the problem of teacher turnover and often create instability in 
schools.301  Statistically, inexperienced teachers who are teaching in 
low-income areas with higher concentrations of people of color will move 
to a different school or leave the profession at significantly higher 
rates.302  Nationally, turnover rates are 70% higher for teachers who 
serve in the largest concentrations of students of color, and this 
percentage increases for teachers in math and sciences, disability, and 
English as a second language.303   
To incentivize teachers to stay, school districts should emphasize or 
create programs that build home-grown teachers by offering competitive 
salary packages in comparison to other professions in the area.304  
Districts who are unable to outright increase teacher salary figures should 
offer the greatest amount they can and focus on creating a work 
environment that encourages teachers to stay put.305  Although 
competitive pay is a factor teachers cite as a reason to leave their schools, 
teachers are greatly influenced by factors such as supportive school 
leadership and teacher preparedness, or opportunities for training.306  
Schools should remain aware of and advocate for legislative 
opportunities to level the inequalities in school finance across districts in 
an effort to curb inter-district teacher attrition because although more 
money is not the only answer, it would certainly help.307   
D. Big Business as an Imbedded Source of Funds for School Finance 
The bottom line is Texas needs more revenue to adequately fund its 
public schools and employees, but the average person does not want to 
 
301. See id. at v, 1–4 (discussing the financial hardships and negative impact of programs 
that allow teachers to move after a short period of time). 
302. Id. at 14. 
303. Id. (analyzing the varying impact of teacher turnover on different subjects in schools 
with a large minority student population). 
304. See id. (urging school districts to create “grow your own” systems that capitalize on 
recruiting local community members and underwrites the costs of teacher attrition). 
305. See Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1597, 1617–19, 1665–67 (2015) (commenting on how teachers are more likely to leave a school 
based on a poor work environment rather than salary). 
306. Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at 32–34. 
307. See Black, supra note 305, at 1615–16 (drawing the connection of low-salaried 
teachers to the quality and employment decisions made). 
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pay higher taxes.308  Many folks have a hard time paying their taxes as 
they are.309  Low and moderately wealthy people should not have to bear 
the burden of providing the extra tax revenue that would make their 
schools adequately funded.310  The revenue needed should not come 
from small businesses struggling to stay in business.311  Rather, the funds 
should be procured from large corporations who manipulate the taxing 
system so that they pay the least amount of taxes possible.312   
Amazon is a prime example.313  In 2018, Amazon made 11 billion 
dollars in profits and paid no income taxes.314  In fact, Amazon received 
129 million dollars in a tax rebate from the federal government.315  How 
is it a company producing $11 billion in profits is able to evade paying 
taxes, yet individuals of modest means struggle to pay their taxes every 
year?316  The answer is simple, Amazon has the means to take advantage 
of the system and exploit loopholes in the tax code.317  In addition, large 
corporations like Amazon also have the means to employ numerous and 
 
308. See Ross Ramsey, Texas Lawmakers Struggling to Find a Loveable Tax, TEX. TRIB. 
(May 24, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/24/texas-lawmakers-struggle-
to-find-loveable-tax/ [https://perma.cc/YZ8B-S597] (referring to the history of disapproval for a 
raise in taxes in the state of Texas). 
309. See id. (discussing the disdain for taxes and the debate for how to provide more money 
to schools without raising taxes). 
310. See, e.g., DAPHNE A. KENYON, THE PROP. TAX–SCH. FUNDING DILEMMA 2 (Lincoln 
Inst. of Land Pol’y, 2007) (“[P]roperty tax relief should be targeted to low-and moderate-income 
households through a mechanism such as a state-funded property tax circuit breaker program.”). 
311. Cf. Andrew Davis, Why Amazon Paid No 2018 US Federal Income Tax, CNBC (Apr. 
4, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/why-amazon-paid-no-federal-income-
tax.html [https://perma.cc/MC6F-73XD] (pointing out how a large corporation avoids paying 
federal income taxes, which inadvertently signifies income-taxes are funded from smaller 
businesses). 
312. See generally id. (expressing discontent with what may be a corporate America tax 
problem that allows big corporations to avoid paying an income tax). 
313. Id. 
314. Id. (noting the disparity between the surging profits acquired by a large corporation 
and the income tax paid out by the same corporation). 
315. Id. (discussing how large corporations such as Amazon, General Motors, Southwest 
Airlines retain advantageous tax benefits in contrast to companies that are not a part of Corporate 
America).  
316. Id. 
317. See Alyssa Pagano & Steve Kovach, Amazon Will Pay $0 in Federal Income Taxes 
this Year—Here’s How the $793 Billion Company Gets Away With It, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 14, 
2019, 9:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-not-paying-taxes-trump-bezos-2018-4 
[https://perma.cc/YJM9-QFZK] (discussing how Corporate America, specifically Amazon, finds 
new ways to avoid taxes). 
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effective lobbyists that ensure changes to the tax code work in their 
favor.318  President Trump’s signature tax bill has made it much easier 
for large corporations to evade taxes.319  Prior to the tax cuts, the 
corporation tax rate was 35% and it has since been cut to 21%.320  As the 
United States is trillions of dollars in debt, the loss in taxes from large 
corporations is sorely missed.321  Investing large amounts of money 
within their company is one way that Amazon works the tax system to 
their benefit.322  Some years, Amazon invested so much of its revenue 
into itself that it did not make a profit.323  Amazon had zero net profit, 
so the company qualified for certain tax breaks.324  Since 1997, Amazon 
has had eight years of losses.325  These losses can carry forward and be 
written off as future tax breaks.326  In 2018, Amazon had 627 million 
dollars of loss that has cumulated and is now eligible to write off.327  
Because it has invested so much in itself, Amazon has been able to 
innovate in areas of artificial intelligence, consumer research, and 
development in general.328  This information and innovation is then 
 
318. See Davis, supra note 311 (broadcasting an interview with a tax lawyer who drafted 
tax law for Congress who shares the consequences when corporate lobbyists have the ability to 
influence the tax code). 
319. See id. (emphasizing how changes to the tax code signed by President Trump allowed 
corporations to slash their federal tax bills). 
320. Jeff Stein & Christopher Ingraham, Corporations Paid 11.3 Percent Tax Rate Last 
Year, in Steep Drop Under Trump’s Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:11 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/12/16/corporations-paid-percent-tax-rate-last-
year-steep-drop-under-president-trumps-law/ [https://perma.cc/5RZ5-8DS2] (stressing how 
President Trump’s signature tax legislation was the reason the corporate tax rate was lowered from 
35 to 21 percent). 
321. See Davis, supra note 311 (describing the thoughts and concerns economists have on 
the consequences of the lowered corporate tax Amazon is benefitting from). 
322. Id. (discussing how Amazon plows large portions of revenue back into itself to 
cultivate long term growth and tax breaks). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. (discussing Amazon’s business practices and how such practices legally permit 
them to pay zero dollars in federal income taxes). 
325. Id. (“8 years of loses since 1997 Amazon IPO.”). 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. See id. (showing how large corporations, such as Amazon, in contrast to smaller 
businesses use tax breaks to their advantage). 
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eligible for tax credits.329  Amazon also receives tax credits for the 
ordinary investment in things like building plants and buying 
machinery.330  The weight of these tax credits were bolstered by 
President Trump’s tax cuts and jobs act.331  The purpose of the tax cuts 
was to help businesses that needed a break in an attempt to be more 
successful, not so they could use the cuts as a way to avoid paying their 
fair share in taxes.332  In 2018, Amazon had 1.4 billion dollars in tax 
credits available to use.333  Tax credits were imposed with the purpose 
of incentivizing businesses to invest in other American businesses to 
benefit the economy.334   
Some economists make the argument that large corporations like 
Amazon should be able to evade paying taxes because it benefits big 
business and when big business is doing well financially, the American 
economy is doing great financially.335  However, this argument does not 
hold up well when considering that the economy is not doing as well as 
it should336  In other words, the supposed benefits of giving businesses 
like Amazon large tax breaks do not outweigh the need for the revenue 
they are not paying.337  Other scholars and analysts argue business like 
 
329. See id. (reiterating how the 2017 tax legislation has only made it easier for Amazon 
and other large corporations to evade taxes); see also Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 
(“[Amazon]’s tax payments are not keeping up with its great wealth.”). 
330. See Davis, supra note 311 (identifying other ways Amazon manipulates the system by 
discussing HQ2, the new Amazon campus that is up for discussion on where it will be built). 
331. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (questioning President Trump’s attacks on 
Amazon for not paying taxes after noting his efforts to make it easier for them to reduce their tax 
bill with the implementation of the new 2017 tax cut and jobs act). 
332. See Kevin Farnsworth & Gary Fooks, Corporate Taxation, Corporate Power, and 
Corporate Harm, 54 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 25, 29 (2015) (evaluating the corporate-friendly type of 
expenses governments aim to allow companies when they write off investment costs). 
333. Davis, supra note 311. 
334. See Farnsworth & Fooks, supra note 332, at 27 (discussing how governments are under 
increased pressure to systematically cut their corporate taxes to induce businesses to invest within 
their communities). 
335. See id. at 26 (claiming some governments turn a blind eye to businesses evading taxes 
when it can benefit their economy). 
336. See id. at 35 (addressing the connection between lost tax revenue and state 
governments’ inability to enact effective public policy). 
337. See id. (analyzing the repercussions of corporate tax breaks on publicly funded social 
programs). 
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Amazon are being rewarded for researching and investing in things that 
it would have already done.338   
Another way Amazon ensures they do not have to pay federal income 
tax is by paying their employees—especially higher-level employees—
partially in stocks.339  As a result, the company is able to subtract the 
value of that stock off their taxes owed.340  As the value of their stock 
increases over time, Amazon is able to write off increasingly large 
amounts of money because the value of the stock when offered to 
employees is lower than the value of the stock when written off.341  
Amazon was able to write off eleven billion dollars in 2018 due in part to 
stock-based compensation tax benefits.342 
Amazon is only one of many big businesses avoiding the payment of 
their fair share of taxes.343  Companies such as General Motors, 
Goldman Sachs, and Southwest Airlines employ many of the same 
methods in order to receive net tax benefits.344  Whether the practices of 
these big businesses are good for the economy or not is up for debate.345  
However, the country, especially its education system, needs this taxable 
revenue from corporations.346  Similar to other states, Texas requires 
 
338.  Davis, supra note 311 (“Amazon’s low tax bill mainly stemmed from the Republican 
tax cuts of 2017, . . . tax credits for massive investments in R&D[,] and stock-based employee 
compensation.”). 
339. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (“Amazon avoids paying federal taxes using a 
variety of tax credits and tax exemptions that are legal and built into the U.S. federal tax code.  [A] 
big [tax credit] for this past year was the ability to deduct stock-based compensation for 
executives.”). 
340. See id. (condemning newly enacted U.S. tax legislation for continuing to allow 
Corporate America to make large tax deductions). 
341. Davis, supra note 311.  See generally Matthew Yglesias, Amazon’s $0 Corporate 
Income Tax Bill Last Year, Explained, VOX (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/ 
20/18231742/amazon-federal-taxes-zero-corporate-income [https://perma.cc/G5B7-W4WV] 
(detailing the process by which corporations use stock-based employee compensation to their 
benefit and the implications on a Corporate America company’s federal taxes). 
342. See Davis, supra note 311 (considering whether the United States has a corporate 
income tax problem). 
343. Id. (confirming Amazon is not the only Corporate America company utilizing and 
receiving tax credits from the federal government to evade their tax bill). 
344. Id. 
345. See id. (illustrating the debilitating consequences of this behavior by big companies). 
346. Id. (supporting the assertion that some people believe taxable revenue for corporations 
are needed and highlighting local opposition to Amazon’s untaxed presence in their community).  
See generally Hilary Russ, Corporate Tax Breaks Cost U.S. Schools Billions of Lost Revenue: 
Report, REUTERS (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taxes-subsidies-education 
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Amazon to charge customers on the site a state sales tax.347  Amazon 
offers a platform for third-party vendors to sell their wares and does not 
collect sales tax from many of those sellers.348  Amazon leaves it up to 
the third-party vendors individually to file and pay taxes in the state they 
have established a sales tax nexus.349  Unfortunately, third-party vendors 
largely fail to file and pay state sales taxes on the sales they’ve made 
through Amazon.350  The amount of sales taxes that have gone 
uncollected are sizable and could have been put toward Texas’s education 
fund.351  This untapped revenue would help provide a stable source of 
funds for education finance.352   
E. HB 1525, an Example 
The Revenue Sourced from HB 1525 should be directed to Texas’s 
Education Budget.  Collecting taxes from third-party vendors in online 
marketplaces is difficult for a few reasons.353  Before 2018, state actors 
 
/corporate-tax-breaks-cost-u-s-schools-billions-of-lost-revenue-report-idUSKBN1O30B3 [https:// 
perma.cc/RR3C-UR33] (outlining the negative implications large corporate tax cuts have on the 
public education system across the United States). 
347. See Edgar Walters, After Supreme Court Ruling, Texas Bills Would Bring in $850 
Million in Online Sales Tax, TEX. TRIB. (May 3, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2019/05/03/texas-bills-would-bring-850-million-online-sales-tax/ [https://perma.cc/VH4P-4PFU] 
(reporting on the Texas Senate bill passed in 2019, allowing Texas to collect sales tax on internet-
based vendors). 
348. Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (“Amazon does a really good job at avoiding federal 
taxes, and for most of its existence, it avoided charging you state sales tax.  That’s because of a 
Supreme Court case from 1992 that prevented states from collecting sales tax from e-commerce 
companies.  It allowed Amazon and other retailers to sell tons of stuff to you effectively tax-free.  
By 2017, that all changed, Amazon started charging sales tax in all the states that have it, but it’s 
not that simple, a lot of third-party sellers sell stuff through Amazon as well, and many of them 
don’t charge sales tax.”). 
349. See id. (detailing how e-commerce companies, such as Amazon, avoided the collection 
sales taxes). 
350. See id. (“[T]here are tens of millions of dollars every year in state sales tax that go 
uncollected from third-party sellers”). 
351. See Walters, supra note 347 (discussing how a proposed House Bill aimed at  
e-commerce platforms can “require marketplaces such as Etsy, Ebay and Amazon to collect sales 
tax on third-party, out-of-state sellers and is expected to yield more than half a billion dollars for 
the state.”). 
352. See generally Brian Stork, What About Our Future? The Chaos that is the Texas School 
Finance System, 8 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST.  307, 345 (2006) 
(addressing the various ways to overcome school finance uncertainty). 
353. See Walters, supra note 347 (detailing the intricacies of developing a sales tax bill for 
the digital marketplace—vendors who sell goods in a state without a physical presence). 
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were unsure whether taxing online marketplaces that do not have a 
physical presence was even constitutional.354  Moreover, South Dakota 
v. Wayfair Inc. held taxing these marketplaces is constitutional.355  
Obstacles for the Texas state tax systems, however, still remain.356  
Though the third-party vendors can be taxed, Texas has a fairly confusing 
taxing system that does not facilitate an efficient collection of funds.357  
Vendors aiming to comply with the taxing system face the challenge of 
figuring out which sales tax rates to apply.358  Local taxing jurisdictions 
in Texas have varying tax rates from 6.25% to 8.25%.359  Effective 
October 1, 2019, HB 2153 was signed into law.360  This law allows the 
Texas Comptroller to set one tax rate for vendors to use so their tax 
calculations can be more streamlined.361   
 
354. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018) (holding States may 
require companies without a physical presence in a  state to their equal share of burdening taxes 
and stating stare decisis could not support a “prohibition on the valid exercise of a states’ sovereign 
power.”); see also Walters, supra note 347 (referencing the 2018 Supreme Court decision in South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, declaring the practice constitutional and the subsequent state bills proposed in 
response to the decision). 
355. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (overruling previous precedent that mandated a 
business have a physical presence in a state before a state government can collect state sales tax); 
see also Walters, supra note 347 (reporting the Texas Legislature’s bill proposals to tax online 
marketplaces after the South Dakota v. Wayfair decision). 
356. See Maria Halkias, Texas Was Tougher Than Other States in Dealing with Amazon on 
Sales Taxes, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/ 
business/retail/2018/03/29/texas-was-tougher-than-other-states-in-dealing-with-amazon-on-sales-
taxes/ [https://perma.cc/ZD6L-PTX8] (highlighting estimates that suggest Texas is missing out on 
$1 billion in sales tax revenue from online retailers with no physical presence in the state); see also 
Walters, supra note 347 (identifying the varying sales tax rates across local jurisdictions as an 
obstacle and area of reform). 
357. See Walters, supra note 347 (reporting the two bills introduced in the Texas Senate 
intend to create a new mechanism for collecting sales tax from third-party vendors with no physical 
presence in the state). 
358. See id. (commenting how lawmakers intend to simplify local sales tax rates for online 
vendors). 
359. Id. 
360. See George W. Rendziperis, Tax Update from the Texas 86th Legislative Session  
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/tax-update-texas-86th-legislative-session 
[https://perma.cc/XS2K-6H8Q] (reporting Texas’s response to the Wayfair decision to require 
“remote sellers” to collect Texas sales taxes if they do “not have a physical presence in Texas” and 
sell products or services in Texas of $500,000 or more). 
361. Id.  
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Also effective October 1, 2019 is HB 1525.362  This bill requires 
online marketplaces, such as Amazon, Etsy, and eBay, to collect the 
third-party sales tax revenue themselves and then direct it back to 
Texas.363  Although third-party vendors sometimes had access to 
marketplace tax collecting services, they were never required to prove to 
the marketplace forum they were, in fact, paying sales taxes on the goods 
they sold, and this is in large part why such a large bulk of taxes were 
never collected.364  The estimated yield from these changes is $550 
million in 2020 and 2021.365  Lawmakers are excited about finding 
additional revenue from existing taxes because it means that there is a 
little less pressure on the state’s Legislature to come up with needed 
funding across the board when they get in a bind for cash.366  There have 
been some proposals to use the revenue to decrease property taxes, but 
this money should be spent on Texas Public Education.367   
I recommend Texas voters and education groups lobby the Legislature 
and demand legislation that takes the additional revenue from these taxes 
to be directed to the Foundational School Program.368  This will be a 
more dependable method of supplying some of the funding to schools on 
 
362. See id. (noting HB 1525 benefits the state because it allows the collection of more sales 
tax from fewer taxpayers, resulting in simpler compliance). 
363. See Walters, supra note 347 (“HB 1525 provides that a “marketplace provider” is 
required to collect, report, and remit taxes imposed on all sales of taxable items made through the 
marketplace to the comptroller.”). 
364. See Pagano & Kovach, supra note 317 (highlighting e-commerce platforms, such as 
Amazon, whose third-party vendors avoid the collection of sales taxes). 
365. Walters, supra note 347 (describing the benefits HB 1525 could yield by requiring 
“marketplaces such as Etsy, Ebay and Amazon to collect sales tax on third-party, out-of-state 
sellers . . . .”). 
366. See Ramsey, supra note 308 (noting one proposed bill wanted to wipe out most school 
property taxes which would require the Legislature to replace $30 billion of the tax revenues before 
the next session). 
367. See, e.g., Edgar Walters & Darla Cameron, From Property Taxes to Teacher Pay, 
Here’s How the Texas Legislature Handled Spending Priorities, TEX. TRIB., https://apps. 
texastribune.org/features/2019/house-senate-texas-budgets-2020/ [https://perma.cc/6WBH-9G8Y] 
(updated May 31, 2019, 4:00 PM) (reporting how the Texas Legislature spent $5 Billion from their 
state funds to cut property taxes). 
368. Glenn Hegar, Texas School Finance: Doing the Math on the State’s Biggest 
Expenditure, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCTS. 7 (Jan. 2019), https://comptroller.texas.gov/ 
economy/fiscal-notes/2019/jan/ [https://perma.cc/Y2U4-W4VB] (explaining how the Texas’s 
Foundational School Program is funded through a series of formulas determining the amount of 
funding a school district receives). 
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a regular basis.369  If the Texas Legislature were to use the remote vendor 
tax as at least one of the methods of sustaining the funding HB 3 promises 
to deliver on in the future, school districts will be able to rely more on the 
money HB 3 has promised after 2021.370  Though grateful for the money 
HB 3 affords them for allotments and school employee pay, school 
officials are operating on the assumption the money backing these new 
improvements will not last.371  The effect is schools cannot leverage the 
new money coming into programs like special education or English 
language readiness because the programs will fall apart the moment the 
Legislature is unable to continue the funding.372 
Ultimately, this type of uncertainty and instability negatively impacts 
children and their educational development; using the revenue from HB 
1525 can help remedy some of that instability.373  Pushing for this 
recommendation may sound like a herculean effort, but it is not asking 
too much.374  The Legislature could not ignore the flailing Texas school 
 
369. See Public Education Reforms Lack Financial Stability, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS 
NEWS (June 11, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/editorials/article/Public-
education-reforms-lack-financial-13969323.php [https://perma.cc/C3HC-EG2C] (urging the Texas 
Legislature to avoid disaster by moving forward economic plans aimed at providing long term 
sustainability for public education). 
370. See Andrea Zelinkski, Texas Teachers Embrace $11.5B Windfall for Education. But 
Will It Last? HOUS. CHRON. (June 13, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Texas-Gov-Abbott-signs-school-funding-overhaul-13968483.php [https:// 
perma.cc/7K74-3EKD] (reporting on the nervous skepticism felt by Texas educators about the 
long-term funding issues).   
371. See Aliyya Swaby, With Conflicting Budget Estimates, Will Texas Teachers Get the 
Pay Raises They Anticipated?, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.texas 
tribune.org/2019/07/03/teacher-pay-raises-school-district-budgets/ [https://perma.cc/4RKK-65 
SV] [hereinafter Conflicting Budget Estimates] (reporting on the feelings of uncertainty for 
numerous local Texas school districts’ who remain unsure of whether the State will continue 
funding to increase teacher salaries when the next legislature meets). 
372. See Don’t Get Distracted by Recapture: Our Biggest School Finance Challenge Is a 
Lack of Revenue, EVERY TEXAN (Nov. 13, 2018), http://bettertexasblog.org/2018/11/dont-get-
distracted-by-recapture-our-biggest-school-finance-challenge-is-a-lack-of-revenue/ [https://perma 
.cc/LQ7D-W2FJ] (stressing the notion Texas public schools are severely underfunded). 
373. See, e.g., Tanya Reyna, A Look at Educational Inequalities in Texas, TEX. TRIB.  
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.tribtalk.org/2018/01/29/a-look-at-educational-inequality-in-texas/#: 
~:text=Over%20the%20past%20decade%2C%20Texas,a%20victim%20of%20educational%20in
equality [https://perma.cc/QBZ4-VKLD] (stating a 16% decline in per-student state funding 
occurred for public education between 2008 to 2015 and can result in educational inequality). 
374. See Ruth N. López Turley, Per-pupil Spending for Poor Students Is Too Low in Texas, 
RICE: KINDER INST. FOR URB. RSCH. (June 2, 2020), https://kinder.rice.edu/urbanedge/2020/06/02/ 
education-disparities-spending-poor-students-too-low-texas [https://perma.cc/ELX9-F8MY] 
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finance system anymore and worked very hard to develop a bill that 
promised to help remedy some of the inadequacies schools deal with 
every day.375  The Legislature promised it would make up the difference 
in revenues lost by lowering the recapture payments and focusing on 
decreasing property taxes.376  Then, it is not too much to ask the 
Legislature how they will make up the difference on a regular basis so 
that the funding can be relied on by teachers and other school 
employees.377  The communities Texas public schools serve cannot 
afford to have the IOU come to nothing and leave our school finance 
system even more vulnerable.378 
CONCLUSION 
We have long said we value education and we want to provide our 
children with a quality one.379  But that is not quite true.380  In reality, 
we have only valued education for some people.381  The problems that 
 
(viewing the correlation between state funding gaps in per-pupil investments and gaps in student 
educational outcomes and noting the need for educational equity to provide “all students the 
resources they need to succeed . . . .”). 
375. See Zelinkski, supra note 370 (recognizing the Legislature’s commitment to overhaul 
funding of Texas’s public education and discussing the uncertainty and optimism a long-term 
source for funding will be implemented before the 2021 legislation session). 
376. See, e.g., Renee Yan, Carrol ISD Projects Lower Property Taxes, Recapture  
Payments with New School Finance Law, CMTY. IMPACT NEWSPAPER (June 18, 2019, 2:37 AM), 
https://communityimpact.com/dallas-fort-worth/grapevine-colleyville-southlake/city-county/2019 
/06/17/carroll-isd-projects-lower-property-taxes-recapture-payments-with-new-school-finance-
law/ [https://perma.cc/7QZL-GJVL] (showing how Carrol ISD expects HB 3 to increase its public 
education spending while reducing the district’s property tax bills). 
377. See Zelinkski, supra note 370 (expressing hope Texas lawmakers will “ensure their 
HB 3 investment in education and property tax relief will be sustainable.”). 
378. See Conflicting Budget Estimates, supra note 371 (emphasizing uncertainty on HB 3’s 
sustainability come the 2021 Legislative Session). 
379. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments. . . .  It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship. . . .  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.”). 
380. See Albert Kauffman, The Texas Supreme Court Retreats from Protecting Texas 
Students, 19 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 145, 152 (2017) (emphasizing 
disparities between poor and wealthy communities and the correlation to the quality of public 
education). 
381. See A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 18 June 1779, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2019), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-
0079 [https://perma.cc/2RTN-QTCU] (stating the initial bill applied to only certain children). 
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we face with inequitable funding which disfavors students who come 
from low-income communities stem from our past.382  When Thomas 
Jefferson proposed “A Bill for the More General Diffusion of 
Knowledge,” he attempted to bring the general public a step forward 
towards a system of free education.383  But he left communities of color 
behind.384  Whether such an expectation would have been practical at 
the time is not the issue.  The point, here, is we have consistently left 
communities of color behind in our history and today is no exception.385  
The education finance system was never built with both low-income and 
minority populations in mind.386  These groups have disproportionally 
felt the effects of inadequate funding primarily through higher teacher 
turnover rates and instability in enrichment programs, which significantly 
lessen the positive impact to the very students those programs are 
designed to help.387  All public schools, specifically low-income schools, 
are owed an assurance that state-contributed funding will come from both 
 
382. See Luis Figueroa, Closing Thoughts on HB 3, the Big School Finance Bill, EVERY 
TEXAN (May 25, 2019) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and Social 
Justice) (proclaiming the inequitable tax compression creates funding disparities within different 
communities). 
383. See generally FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 381 (proclaiming “without regard to 
wealth, birth, or other accidental condition or circumstances,” children should be educated at the 
common expense of everyone instead of confining such education to a select group of individuals). 
384. See id. (addressing how the bill specifically states public facilities apply only to the 
free children) (emphasis added). 
385. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1973) (reiterating 
how the Supreme Court did not recognize education as a fundamental right in a lawsuit brought by 
members of minority groups who came from districts with lower property values); see also 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989) (referring to the lawsuit 
brought by the parents of children who lived in poor districts, whose access to opportunities for 
educational funds was inequitable when compared to those children who lived in rich districts); see 
also Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (illustrating the principle separate 
educational facilities based on race was held to be inherently unequal and had a detrimental effect 
on African American children). 
386. See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392 (“School districts derive revenues from local ad 
valorem property taxes, and the state raises funds from a variety of sources including the sales tax 
and various severance and excise taxes.  There are glaring disparities in the abilities of the various 
school districts to raise revenues from property taxes because taxable property wealth varies greatly 
from district to district.”). 
387. See Desiree Carver-Thomas & Linda Darling Hammond, Teacher Turnover:  
Why It Matters and What We Can Do About It, LEARNING POL’Y INST. 30–31 (Aug. 2017), 
https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/Teacher_Turnover_REPORT. 
pdf (showing why there is a high turnover for teachers in areas where there is inadequate funding 
in low income and minority populations). 
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a stable and sustainable source of revenue.388  Hiding behind the 
argument “money does not matter” is unacceptable.389  As a Texan 
community, we need to change our thinking on how we view taxes.  We 
must understand an investment in education for lower income schools is 
an investment that will benefit communities as a whole.390  A more 
specific solution to the instability of HB 3 is to reserve the revenue from 
HB 1525 for education finance.391  School districts should be proactive 
and consistently advocate for a more equitable system of funding; these 
districts must not wait to act until the system has become totally outdated 
for their needs.392  Concurrently, Texas schools need to elevate the 
profession of teaching by offering the best possible compensation 
packages and rely more on home-grown teacher models of employment 
as methods of retaining teachers because we know people who are 
employed in their hometown are more likely to stay there.393  The quality 
of education a child receives sets the stage for the rest of that child’s life, 
and often the lives of those around them.394  Texas should invest in itself 
and actively seek to minimize inequities in our education finance system 
because children do not ask to be born, they do not get to choose how 
wealthy their families will be nor where they get to live.395  The quality 
of education children get and the start they have in life should not be 
determined by chance.396  We have a moral imperative to give every 
child an equal opportunity to a high-quality education. 
 
388. See Figueroa, supra note 382 (admitting HB 3 lacks a sustainable source of funding). 
389. Id. 
390. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222–23 (1982) (“Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society.”). 
391. See Walters, supra note 347 (reiterating revenue and uncollected sales tax from HB 
1525 are considerable and should be redirected to Texas’s Education Budget). 
392. Id.  
393. See Carver-Thomas & Hammond, supra note 221, at vi, 4–5 (providing one of a few 
key solutions where schools can improve teacher turnover rates). 
394. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (recognizing education is the foundation and most 
important function to our society). 
395. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. 1989) 
(suggesting the system is both limited and unbalanced). 
396. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (illustrating the need for quality 
education and the purpose it serves to each community across the nation). 
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